

JPRS-TAC-91-019
8 AUGUST 1991



JPRS Report

Arms Control

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Washington Talks on START Treaty Examined

HK1907042491 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
18 Jul 91 p 6

[Article by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500):
"Baker-Bessmertnykh Talks, Strategic Arms Treaty"]

[Text] Washington, 15 July (RENMIN RIBAO)—Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh recently visited Washington, where he met with U.S. President Bush and held a four-day meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker on the issue of the U.S.-USSR strategic arms reduction treaty. The two men sought to iron out the remaining differences regarding the treaty in order to pave the way for the signing of a nuclear treaty during the Moscow meeting of the two heads of state.

Agreement was reached between the two sides on the still unresolved issues of the treaty during the talks. A meeting between the two heads of state will be held very soon. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks. Bessmertnykh said that the nine-year-long negotiations were coming to an end. For his part, Baker said: We have arrived at a crucial stage where it is possible to have a strategic arms treaty.

The signing of a treaty to reduce offensive strategic arms is a common need and aspiration of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In recent years, the two countries have always regarded such a treaty as a major objective in bilateral arms control talks, but for various reasons this treaty underwent countless setbacks and was never completed. In June last year, Bush and Gorbachev issued a statement during their heads-of-state summit in Washington asserting that drafting of the treaty would be completed that year. The two sides also decided to sign the treaty during the summit meeting in Moscow in February 1991.

However, U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks entered a stalemate in the last six months, while the summit meeting was postponed once again. This was closely related to the outbreak of the Gulf war, as well as to the turbulence in the domestic situation of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the U.S.-Soviet dispute over the issue of conventional arms in Europe also had an adverse effect on the nuclear talks. Not long after the East-West European conventional arms treaty was signed last November, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to show signs of differences on the interpretation of this treaty, the question being whether or not several thousand of the Soviet Union's arms and installations in Europe should be slated for destruction, as stipulated in the treaty. The Soviet Union maintained that these weapons belonged to the navy and were not covered by the treaty; the United States insisted that the Soviet military was trying to elude treaty restrictions and even asserted that unless differences on the European disarmament treaty were resolved first, it would not be possible to carry on with the nuclear talks. It was this dispute that caused the suspension of the nuclear talks for several months.

In the past month, as U.S.-Soviet relations "went through a difficult period" (in Baker's words), the two sides subsequently reached agreement on the differences regarding the European conventional arms treaty, while the nuclear talks were resumed and intensified. Not long ago, in an exchange of letters, both Bush and Gorbachev came up with some new proposals and ideas regarding the resolution of the differences over the treaty. A foreign ministerial meeting was held against this background and was decided on by the highest leaders of the two countries. And the fact that the meeting was held continuously for several days showed the desire of the two countries to use the occasion to end the talks as soon as possible, realize the summit meeting in Moscow, and sign the treaty. Analysts here have maintained that the United States wanted to pin down the outcome of all these years of nuclear talks through the signing of the treaty so that U.S.-Soviet relations may move away from their traditional center of arms control to other important domains. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union hoped to expand its political influence both at home and abroad and to secure Western economic cooperation through the achievements in arms control.

The U.S.-USSR talks of the past few days were concentrated on the settlement of three unresolved issues in the treaty: 1) How to define a type of missile as a "new type of missile" the development of which is permitted by the treaty. 2) How to supply the other side with information during a missile test in order to determine that the test is not in violation of the treaty. 3) By how many warheads the two sides should reduce the payloads of their missiles. These problems are highly technical, but because they concerned the interests of the two sides, as well as the observance of the treaty, experts from both sides taking part in the talks were engaged in judicious haggling over every single technical detail.

Provisions regarding the technical specifications of the new types of missiles and demands that information about missile tests conducted by the two sides be provided in an agreed manner are intended to prevent one side from violating the treaty and thus jeopardizing the strategic interests of the other. Compromises also were made by the two sides in these areas during the talks.

Owing to the advances made during this foreign ministerial meeting, completion of the strategic arms treaty can be expected very soon. This treaty will stipulate that both the United States and the Soviet Union reduce to no more than 6,000 the number of carriers for the three kinds of strategic weapons (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched guided missiles, and heavy bombers) they each deploy, while the number of warheads they each deploy also should be reduced to the ceiling of 6,000. This treaty will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to cut down on their massive strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time, but the limitations it imposes are not very obvious. The treaty still will leave both the United States and the Soviet Union with not only a formidable number of nuclear

weapons, but also the possibility of continued improvement in the quality of nuclear weapons. This is still a long way from the aspirations of the world's people for nuclear disarmament. It can be said that both the United States and the Soviet Union still have a long way to go on the road toward nuclear disarmament.

'News Analysis' Examines START Accord

OW1907150991 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0312 GMT 19 Jul 91

[News analysis by XINHUA reporters Wei Guoqiang (7614 0948 1730) and Huang Yong (7806 0516): "How Did the United States and the Soviet Union Reach Agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty?"]

[Text] After their meeting in London today, U.S. President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev announced that the two countries have eliminated the last remaining differences pertaining to strategic arms reduction, thus paving the way for their meeting in Moscow at the end of the month and the official signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

The United States and the Soviet Union had basically completed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty at the end of last year after 9 years of arduous talks; however, official agreement has not been reached for several reasons, including the outbreak of the Gulf war and changes in the Soviet Union's internal situation. Under pressure from Bush and Gorbachev since May this year, the foreign ministers of the two countries held numerous talks and finally eliminated the remaining differences.

That the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty stems from their respective individual needs. Some observers pointed out that, hard pressed by the Soviet Union's internal political and economic pressure, Gorbachev was anxious to hold a summit meeting with Bush, sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and obtain economic aid from the United States and other Western countries. However, the United States had earlier let it be known that Bush would travel to Moscow to hold talks with Gorbachev and to sign the agreement on an economic cooperation package reached between the United States and the Soviet Union only after the two countries reach a final agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Therefore, the Soviet Union had shown great initiative regarding the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and had successively made major compromises.

As for the United States, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is militarily beneficial. According to the stipulations of the treaty, the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear arms will be reduced 30-35 percent, including a 50-percent reduction of the huge SS-18 land-based intercontinental missiles, the mainstay of the Soviet Union's strategic arms; meanwhile, U.S. strategic arms will only be reduced 20-25 percent. This will, to a certain extent, alter the two countries' current balance of strategic arms to the advantage of the United States. In addition, the United States desires an early signing of the treaty because it is concerned about the Soviet Union's complicated internal situation. There is concern that a change in the political scene may occur that could hinder the signing of the treaty, and the advantages that the United States gained from strategic arms reduction talks in the last few years could be irrevocably lost.

The agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty marked another achievement in the two countries' arms control talks and further eased the U.S.-Soviet military confrontation. However, the international media also pointed out that the treaty still permits the United States and the Soviet Union to possess 9,000 and 7,000 nuclear warheads, respectively, and it does not obstruct the two countries from replacing those arms with an arsenal of higher quality. From this point of view, the agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is merely a very limited step forward in the two countries' efforts to control the arm race.

Building of Strategic Missile Bases Reported

OW2907013191 Beijing Central People's Radio Network in Mandarin 2130 GMT 28 Jul 91

[From the "Beijing Press Review", "News and Press Review" program]

[Text] JIEFANGJUN BAO [29 July] published a newsletter on the contributions made by the People's Liberation Army's 2d Artillery Corps in constructing China's strategic guided missile bases.

After our country's successful nuclear explosion, some people derided us for having only atomic bombs but no carrier. Shortly afterward, China successfully launched its first nuclear guided missile, thus realizing the dream of the Chinese people of many generations.

The newsletter describes the relentless efforts by the officers and men of the 2d Artillery Corps to master modern sophisticated weaponry and to build guided missile bases of different types and different launching methods, enabling the corps to become a special force in more than two decades.

AUSTRALIA

Foreign Minister Hits Latest French Nuclear Test

BK1707070091 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Text] Australia has expressed disappointment and New Zealand anger at the latest French nuclear test at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. The test yesterday was estimated by Australian and New Zealand seismological centers at between 20 and 80 kilotons. France said it was less than 50 kilotons.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon said New Zealand was sick and tired of the French tests and the French continued to misjudge the mood of the South Pacific. He said the tests continued at the time when the cold war is over and the security situation in Europe has changed.

Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, said it was deeply disappointing that France has continued its test programs in the face of strong and widespread opposition in the region.

Radio Australia's Canberra office said the latest test came at a particularly unfortunate time as it coincided with the visit to Australia by France's junior foreign minister, Alan Vivien. Meanwhile, Mr. Vivien has begun a 3-day visit to Papua New Guinea. He is the highest-level French official to visit since 1985. Mr. Vivien is scheduled to hold a series of talks with Papua New Guinea leaders, including the prime minister, Rabbie Namaliu, and foreign minister, Michael Somare.

He is being accompanied by France's permanent secretary to the South Pacific, Jacques Le Blanc.

NORTH KOREA

Peace, Nuclear Weapons Said Incompatible

SK1907112791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1032 GMT 19 Jul 91

[Text] Pyongyang, July 19 (KCNA)—Peace and nuclear weapons are incompatible and it is a requirement of the times to build a peaceful world free from nuclear weapons, says a by-lined article of NODONG SINMUN today, which reads in part:

A peaceful world desired by mankind is a world free from the danger of nuclear arms, all of them eliminated from the earth.

If such a world is to be built, the production of nuclear arms must be stopped and the existing nukes be eliminated completely.

Production of nuclear weapons must be stopped above anything else. If their production is allowed, there will be more stockpiles of nuclear arms on the globe and that will increase possibilities of nuclear clash.

It is also an important requisite to world peace to eliminate the existing nuclear arms.

What is important in their dismantlement is to realize universal and complete nuclear disarmament so it may lead to genuine peace.

However, the United States is now filling a gap caused by reduction of some nuclear arms with new-type nuclear weapons and working to shift nuclear arms which are being withdrawn from Europe to the Asia-Pacific and other regions. This is virtually redeployment of nuclear forces, not disarmament. In the final analysis, detente in one region will only result in keying up another tension in the other.

Nuclear disarmament must, of course, be done preferentially in the region where nuclear weapons are densely deployed and which is fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war.

South Korea ranks first in the world in the density of nuclear arms deployment and it is a hotbed of global nuclear war. If a war break [as received] out in Korea, with many nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, it will turn into a nuclear one and not only the Korean people but a large number of people in Asia and the rest of the world as well will suffer horrible nuclear disasters.

Peace can be won only through the stubborn struggle of the people of broad strata the world over against the imperialists' policies of aggression and war, the article notes, and goes on:

The world's progressive people must wage a more dynamic struggle for the withdrawal of imperialists' aggressive military bases and armed forces and for the creation of nuclear-free, peace zones. They, in particular, should never tolerate the U.S. imperialists' armed intervention and their policies of aggression against other countries but check and frustrate them by dealing a collective counterattack at them.

The Korean people, in firm unity with all the world's people who love justice and peace, will thwart the imperialists' policies of aggression and war and more vigorously fight for world peace.

Japanese Groups Back Denuclearized Korea

SK2307051291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0434 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Pyongyang, July 23 (KCNA)—A delegation of the Osaka council of Japan-Korea joint struggle headed by Yoshie Katsuma, chairwoman of the Osaka Prefectural headquarters of the Japan women's council, in a statement released in Pyongyang on July 20 strongly demanded that the United States pull its nuclear weapons and troops out of South Korea.

Expressing full support to the joint statement of the DPRK political parties and public organisations, the statement said that more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear

weapons deployed in South Korea pose a great threat not only to the DPRK but also to peace in Japan and Asia.

The purpose sought by the U.S. authorities in their recent outcry over the fiction of "nuclear weapons" possessed by the DPRK is to divert elsewhere the attention of the world from their nuclear arms deployed in South Korea, the statement noted, and continued:

If a nuclear inspection is to be made, the U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea should be made public and an international nuclear inspection be made simultaneously, not crying for a unilateral inspection of the north of Korea where there are no nuclear weapons.

It is strange that Japan, the first victim to the U.S. atomic bombs in the world, ignoring the danger of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, is trying to force "nuclear inspection" upon the DPRK that has no nuclear arms.

Japan should pay attention to the removal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and play a positive role.

For a durable peace on the Korean peninsula a peace agreement between the DPRK and the United States should be concluded, a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South be adopted and the reunification of Korea be achieved in the mode of confederacy.

The normalisation of Japan-DPRK diplomatic relations should be realised as early as possible in accordance with the basic spirit of the joint declaration of the three parties.

The Japanese Government should establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK on the basis of a reflection on the 36 year-long colonial domination of the Japanese imperialism over the Korean people and the policy hostile toward the DPRK for 46 years after the war and an adequate compensation for them.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Hungary, CSFR, Poland Submit CFE Proposal

LD1707211891 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1900 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Text] In Vienna, Hungary, together with her two neighbors, submitted a joint proposal which says that units of the internal security and other semi-military organizations should also be involved in the planned reduction of traditional military forces. The initiative was prepared by our country's experts together with their Czechoslovak and Polish colleagues. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmathi, leader of the Hungarian delegation, said in his speech that the assessment on limiting the number of the military can only be carried out on a national scale in every state, individually.

Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw consider it important that the accord under preparation states that no single country should have a larger military force than one-third of the total number of units of the 22 negotiating states.

BULGARIA

Ministry Defends Purchase of SS-23 Missiles

AU2507084691 Sofia BTA in English 0814 GMT
25 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 25 (BTA)—Some U.S. sources reported yesterday that the USSR had sold Bulgaria seven SS-23 missiles in violation of the 1987 Moscow-Washington INF Treaty. In this connection, Lieutenant General Ivan Stefanov, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, made the following statement on national television last night:

"The missiles were delivered under an intergovernmental agreement signed in 1986. The seven missiles and two launchers arrived in February 1987. Bulgaria has not bought any more missiles since December 8, 1987," General Stefanov said. Under the INF Treaty, only missiles owned by the two contracting parties or delivered after the signing of the treaty are subject to dismantling and control.

The SS-23 missiles in Bulgaria, armed with conventional warheads, are within the 400 km range and are manned by Bulgarian experts only. Still, they enhance Bulgaria's defence capability, General Stefanov said.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

President Havel Signs CFE Instruments of Ratification

LD2207182791 Prague CTK in English 1522 GMT
22 Jul 91

[Text] Prague, July 22 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel signed here on July 19 the instruments of

ratification of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe [CFE], the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announced today.

Czechoslovakia became the first of the 22 countries, which signed the document in Paris last November, to ratify it.

The treaty lays foundations of a new security system in Europe. Its implementation will considerably decrease the concentration of conventional armed forces in Europe.

Chief of Staff: CSFR SS-23's Not Covered by INF Treaty

LD2707133891 Prague CTK in English 1022 GMT
27 Jul 91

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Prague, July 27 (CTK)—the Czech daily "MLADA FRONTA DNES" today deals with the fact that the Czechoslovak Army has twenty-four SS-23 Soviet-made medium-range missiles. It quotes General Karel Pezl, chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Army, as saying that the missiles were supplied to Czechoslovakia several years before the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaty on medium and short-range missiles, i.e. before summer 1987. Therefore, the treaty was not breached, Pezl added. He also said the Czechoslovak Army has never owned nuclear warheads for the missiles.

POLAND

Lack of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Accord Viewed

LD2307210791 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 2030 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] The 10th round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland has begun in Moscow. The troops are stationed on the basis of a bilateral intergovernmental agreement. An identical agreement should regulate their withdrawal, said government press spokesman Andrzej Zarebski. The lack of such an agreement is one of the hindrances in the construction of good-neighborly relations between our countries, he added.

[Begin recording] Since the start of this year, the Soviet Army has not been paying for transit across Poland, and the accumulated fees on this account owed just to the Polish State Railways already amount to 30 million Swiss francs. A second matter is the lack of access of Polish environmental protection inspection teams to the bases where the Red Army is based. There is significant ecological damage there. We would like to produce an inventory of these. Two inspections held at two airfields revealed that the losses on this account with regard to the environment came to approximately 2 million zlotys.
[end recording]

'Improved Atmosphere' at Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD2507041991 Warsaw PAP in English 2049 GMT
24 Jul 91*

[Text] Moscow, July 24—"The intensification and deepening of dialogue on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland allows us to talk about important progress in the discussions," Jerzy Sulek, director of the European department at the Polish Foreign Ministry and head of the Polish delegation in the bilateral talks, said in Moscow Wednesday [24 July].

Members of the Soviet delegation unofficially expressed satisfaction at the improved atmosphere for the discussions, which had earlier stalled over the projected date for the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory, apportionment of costs relating to Soviet military installations, and environmental and material damage sustained during the 45-year Soviet presence in Poland.

The 11th round of negotiations between the two delegations will take place in Warsaw in August.

IRAN

Majlis Speaker Assails U.S. Mideast Arms Control Plan

LD1707180491 Tehran IRNA in English 1715 GMT
17 Jul 91

[Text] Tehran, 17 July (IRNA)—Majlis speaker Mehdi Karrubi Wednesday described the U.S.-proposed arms control plan as an excuse for interference in the sensitive Middle East region. "We are not against disarmament, but it should apply to all countries," he stressed.

The speaker also accused the U.S. of interfering in the region in a bid to tip the balance of power in favor of Israel and to humiliate regional nations.

Karrubi was speaking to a group of officials including Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, his deputies, Iranian diplomatic corps abroad and organizers of an international conference to support the Palestinian revolution to be held here in October.

On the Islamic Republic's policy of establishing diplomatic relations with the outside world, Karrubi said "while sticking to our principles we can have relations with the outside world except for the U.S., Israel and South Africa."

The Majlis speaker said Iran's policies are based on the main causes of the late founder of the Islamic Republic Imam Khomeyni.

He called on Iranian diplomats to promote Islam in the countries of their assignment besides carrying out their routine duties.

Iran Formulating Regional Arms Control Plan

LD1707101291 Tehran IRNA in English 0700 GMT
17 Jul 91

[Text] Tehran, July 17 (IRNA)—Commander of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC) Mohsen Reza'i said in Islamabad Tuesday that Iran is formulating a plan for arms control in the region which will be announced soon, the Central News Bureau reported.

Reza'i who was speaking to reporters in Islamabad where he is paying an official visit, added that the U.S.-proposed plan for arms control in the region "is a big ploy aimed at confining the Islamic and Third World countries."

"The Iranian plan", the IRGC commander added, "would embody the regional states as well. Even if the U.S. and other big powers seek to pass through waterways of the Islamic countries they should act according to the set regulations."

No doubt, he noted, the Islamic and Third World countries would agree with Iran's plan.

As for the U.S.-engineered new world order, Reza'i said, "This is a big lie because the world is automatically proceeding towards a relative equilibrium."

"In fact", he stressed, "the U.S. has taken advantage of the weakness of the Soviet Union and has no objective other than weakening the Islamic and Third World countries."

Reza'i, heading a high-ranking military delegation, arrived in Islamabad last Tuesday.

Ayatollah Yazdi Critical of Mideast Disarmament Plan

LD2607101691 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0930 GMT 26 Jul 91

[Text] Delivering the Tehran Friday prayers sermons today, the head of the judicial power, Ayatollah Yazdi, condemned the Middle East disarmament plan—a plan which has been designed by the global arrogance. He said: The Islamic Republic of Iran will agree to destroying weapons of mass destruction on a worldwide scale; however, the Islamic Republic cannot accept such a point to be used as a pretext by the arrogant powers for the disarmament of countries of their own choice.

The acting Tehran Friday prayers imam said: Why does this plan overlook the Zionist regime? Indeed, the authors of the plan even go as far as strengthening that regime, while holding that the antagonists of that regime must be disarmed.

He said: the main objective in presenting the said plan is to solve the problems of the arrogance and the Zionist regime in the region. It is designed to be used against the Muslim peoples, especially the Islamic revolution, which is regarded as the principal danger to them.

Ayatollah Yazdi made it clear that the topic of disarmament and compromising plans for Palestine were in fact designed as a second Camp David, which the Muslims should confront. He underlined that the Muslim peoples of the region had now arisen; he said they fully comprehended hidden or apparent current problems. America would be making a mistake if she believed that she could deceive the people through political showmanship.

In his prayer sermons, Ayatollah Yazdi also referred to the holding of magnificent mourning ceremonies of Moharram [marking the martyrdom of Imam Hoseyn, held by Shiites] in various countries of the world, especially Pakistan and Kashmir. Praising the Muslims of these regions, he criticized the insulting afront to these ceremonies by elements who work in the interests of the enemies of Islam. He condemned attacks on the mourning ceremonies in various towns of Pakistan and Kashmir and called on clerics to take up these issues. He stressed that such acts would be acceptable to no sect or faith.

GENERAL**Karpov, French Ambassador Discuss Arms Issues**

*PM1807133791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Jul 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Unattributed report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov received Bertrand Dufourcq, French ambassador to the USSR on 15 July

During the conversation they examined questions connected with the Soviet-U.S. talks on the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, the continuation of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, and the conclusion of the multilateral Convention on Chemical Weapons.

There was also an exchange of views on the results of the meeting of the "five" states, held recently in Paris, on the problem of limiting arms deliveries and questions of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

Bessmertnykh Letter to UN on Defense Policy

*LD2007003691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1945 GMT 19 Jul 91*

[Text] Moscow, 19 July (TASS)—The following is the text of a letter from the USSR Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary General on the subject of defense concepts and security policy:

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

In accordance with resolution 45/58/0 [number as received] of the UN General Assembly, "Defense Concepts and Policy in the Sphere of Security," I have the honor to report the following:

1. Serious changes for the better are occurring in international relations. The period of the "cold war" is over, and favorable conditions are emerging for the formation of a qualitatively new system of mutual relations among states which is capable of providing reliable security not by military, but by political and legal means. That reliability would be achieved by an all-around strengthening of the machinery of international cooperation and interaction together with a radical lowering of the role of military force in the policy of states and openness and verifiability of the military sphere of their activities. Progress toward such a system is the objective trend of world development, but it has not yet become stable. The factor of military force remains one of the main means of providing security, both national and international. In this situation, special importance attaches to multilateral coordination of reliable guarantees in international law of the use of military force exclusively in the interests of maintaining peace and security.

Imparting a defensive orientation to the military-force component in the provision of security would meet the attainment of this task—but this presupposes the introduction of the appropriate changes to national military doctrines.

2. An intensive search is under way in the Soviet Union for new approaches toward the provision of national security in the military-political sphere. The USSR's military doctrine provides an orientation toward the implementation of radical changes in the planning of the use of the armed forces in their structure, in the stationing and the nature of groupings at the theatre of military action, in the system of military organization and the qualitative and quantitative parameters of military potential. In connection with the dissolution of the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty, additional changes are being made to this doctrine aimed at transferring it to the concept of defense within the framework of national borders.

The policy of attaining accords which are significant in the military respect, within the negotiations process, on various aspects of disarmament, retains its priority nature. Soviet-American treaties on medium and shorter range missiles and on nuclear testing have been signed and are being successfully implemented. Agreements, unprecedented in their scale, have been concluded—on the reduction of armed forces and weapons and on the further strengthening of trust in Europe. Real prospects for the conclusion in the near future of an agreement on a substantial reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States have emerged. The Soviet Union is convinced that the difficulties which have arisen at the talks on disarmament recently are wholly surmountable.

It is ready for a constructive search for the mutually acceptable solutions for the remaining unresolved problems. With the aim of stimulating further development of the process of negotiations, the provisions of the agreements already concluded as well as the possible format of the future agreement are being considered in the national plans for the military development of the USSR. In this context the Soviet Union is unilaterally undertaking a wide complex of measures for bringing the country's military potential into strict accordance with the requirements of defense sufficiency. The number of the Soviet Armed Forces, the total number of the military district, armies, and general military divisions has been reduced; the composition of the strike armament system has been limited; the scale of military production and military activity as a whole has been reduced; programs for gearing the military industry to output of civilian production are being implemented.

Thus, the USSR is making the concrete practical steps to adapt its defense construction to the new military-political and strategic realities.

3. At the same time, however, we are proceeding from the fact that imparting a defensive nature to military

doctrines and, accordingly to the military structure, can be implemented only on the basis of reciprocity and within the framework of purposeful efforts by the states together with the extension of this process to all nuclear and other states in possession of great military might. In our opinion, the reinterpretation of the concept of "restraint" which is fundamental to military doctrines should be the starting point in this process. The time has come to begin freeing this from the attributes of confrontation, engendered by the cold war and from the reliance on mutual deterrence by the threat of the application of nuclear weapons. In our view, restraint should, to a greater degree, rely on an extensive system of positive interstate interaction and on the consolidation of political, legal, economic and military efforts by the leading states, under the aegis of the United Nations, aimed at preventing a threat to the peaceful development of international relations or at nipping in the bud acts of aggression and restoring peace, from wherever this threat or aggression might ensue.

4. The Soviet Union is convinced that genuine security for everyone can only be achieved with the full elimination of nuclear weapons and all types of weapons of mass destruction and with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces to the level of reasonable sufficiency.

The stage-by-stage nature of the movement toward a nuclear-free, secure world presupposes the preservation of nuclear weapons for a definite transition period. Under these conditions it is necessary to bring about a consistent reduction in the significance of the nuclear arsenals which remain temporarily in the range of means and methods of providing international security. The reduction of nuclear potentials to the level of minimal nuclear restraint presents itself, at the first stage, as a possible path for the solution of this task.

A key element in the search for a formula for minimal nuclear restraint is, in our view, the determination of the minimum fighting capabilities of the sides, with which each of them is capable under any possible conditions of response actions, of inflicting "restraining" damage on the opposing side. With such an approach minimal nuclear restraint will also guarantee strategic stability.

The question of the essence of "minimal nuclear deterrent" and "deterrent" damage and their role as stabilizing factors could be examined in the course of the appropriate consultations between the five nuclear powers.

The Soviet Union is convinced that the problem of a minimal nuclear deterrent should be viewed in relation to the nonproliferation of nuclear armaments and the means of their delivery, and the rejection of other mass destruction weapons, especially chemical and bacteriological weapons, by all states.

5. In the area of conventional armed forces, the defense concept envisages their limitation to the level of sufficiency, which is understood by us to be a minimum for

combat potential to ensure reliable defense from possible aggression. In our view, the deterrent function of sufficiency, as applied to conventional armed forces, is manifested precisely in this. At the same time, sufficiency level does not create opportunities for a sudden attack and the conduct of large-scale offensive actions without additional deployment of armed forces.

In accordance with such an approach, transition to the practical level of the sufficiency principle as applied to the conventional armed forces, including the land, air force, and naval components, would, in our opinion, mean imparting a nonoffensive structure to the armed forces; the quantitative reduction of the armed forces and armaments; limitation of the systems with sudden attack potential, and the new conventional strike weapons comparable in their destructive potential with the mass destruction weapons; changing the armed forces groupings and their stationing in consideration of the solution of defense tasks; limitation of the intensity of military activities; and reduction of the scale of military production and expenditure.

The defense concept also envisages deployment of the armed forces within the limits of national or state borders and liquidation of military bases on foreign territory.

6. The aims connected with transforming states' military doctrines to give them a defensive character could be attained by means of the synchronization of global and regional efforts in their sphere. The character, speed, and intensity of the reorientation of military doctrines will undoubtedly vary depending upon specific conditions in each specific region. However, the necessity of involving all regions and states in this process, primarily involving those that are the strongest in military and economic terms, remains immutable. Europe, where they have already started to reach agreement on a general concept and specific guidelines for the transition to defensive military doctrines, could serve as an example. It is our conviction that the European experience could prove to be attractive to other regions.

7. As a result of what is obviously manifesting itself as the global character of the problem of reorienting states' military doctrines onto defensive bases, and due to the necessity for active multilateral efforts in this sphere, the Soviet Union advocates the opening up of a broad international dialogue covering the full range of issues relating to defense concepts and policies. [words indistinct] potential of the UN disarmament mechanisms. In particular, we consider that the work already started by the UN in conducting a special investigation into the given problem will be an important contribution to defining specific ways to resolve the tasks arising in this sphere.

The United Nations and its disarmament mechanisms can play a significant role in helping members of the world community reach a general understanding on the

essence and character of defense capability [oborонительnost] as it applies to states' military doctrines.

Powell Discusses Arms Reduction With Gorbachev

LD2307164591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, 23 July (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev today had a meeting with General Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

Soviet-U.S. contacts along military lines are developing successfully, the USSR president observed. Military leaders of both countries have made a major contribution to the success of the talks on nuclear and conventional arms, and thus to the improvement of relations between the USSR and United States. Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized the enormous importance of the START treaty that it is to be signed in a few days' time during the visit to the USSR by U.S. President George Bush. It is the result of persistent mutual efforts by both sides. The 1987 INF treaty, implementation of which will be completed in the near future, has played a role of fundamental importance in the arms reduction process. Talks are to come on enhancing strategic security and on making further cuts in strategic offensive arms. The fact that cooperation is going into effect in the field of conversion is also a significant feature in Soviet-U.S. relations.

Mikhail Gorbachev also dwelled on the restructuring of the Armed Forces in connection with the new military doctrine and in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries. Steps are being taken to resolve the difficult social problems bound up with the relocation of troops.

For his part, General Powell discussed the reductions in the U.S. Armed Forces and military budget which are planned for the coming five years.

Problems of a settlement in the Near and Middle East, as well as in other areas, were touched on. The USSR president said that they can only be resolved by peaceful means.

Taking part in the conversation, which was held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and frankness, were Dmitriy Yazov, Mikhail Moiseyev, Sergey Akhromeyev, and Ambassador Jack Matlock.

START TALKS

Churkin Interviewed on START Agreement

OW1807143491 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1238 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, by

NHK commentator Jiro Hirano and NHK's Moscow correspondent Kazuo Kobayashi in a London studio with Churkin, and NHK anchorwoman Tadashi Sonoda in a Tokyo studio—live; from "News 21 Special" program on results of the London summit; Churkin speaks in Russian with superimposed simultaneous translation in Japanese; translated from the Japanese]

[Text] [Sonoda] We have Mr. Churkin, chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, as our guest in our London studio. Let us interview him regarding the results of today's U.S.-Soviet summit talks.

Mr. Churkin, it appears that the United States and the Soviet Union have achieved an accord on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START]. What is the Soviet side's comment on the accord?

[Churkin] The START negotiations have finally been completed after a series of preliminary talks over the past decade. START is the world's first nuclear arms reduction accord. It is quite remarkable from a global standpoint since it will control the strategic arms of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It will result in not only stabilized U.S.-Soviet ties, but also in worldwide disarmament, most significantly in Europe and Asia.

[Kobayashi] Does the completion of START mean that Mr. Gorbachev has succeeded in persuading the Soviet military authorities to accept the agreement? I mean, can we regard the accord as a sign that his leadership has been strengthened so that he can overcome strong pressures from the military authorities?

[Churkin] We have settled every difficult question we have been faced with. I think that even the U.S. side will face problems in obtaining congressional approval of the START accord drawn up between Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and commanding officers of the U.S. Forces. From my viewpoint, each leader should settle such problems as everyday issues of domestic affairs. I am happy with the fact that the START is almost settled between the two leaders.

[Kobayashi] It seems that you are presenting a very optimistic viewpoint as the Soviet Union's official spokesman. In fact, however, there are severe conflicts between conservatives and liberals in your nation. Under such circumstances, what significance does Mr. Gorbachev attach to the U.S.-Soviet summit talks? Are they helpful for Mr. Gorbachev in stabilizing his political power?

[Churkin] Of course, the summit results will help him a lot. The two nations have been seeking dialogue for several decades, and disarmament and defense expenditures reduction have always been their primary concern. Diplomatic achievements strengthen political leaders. As a matter of course, the summit results will be reflected

in the domestic politics of both nations because both President Bush and President Gorbachev are facing election next year.

[Hirano] I would like to ask you about the relationship between the START accord and President Gorbachev's meetings with leaders of the Group of Seven [G-7] nations. Some G-7 leaders have indicated that the promotion of economic assistance to the Soviet Union is questionable since your nation still lavishes defense expenditures despite its economic reform policy. Can we regard the START accord as the Soviet Union's great commitment to accelerating the conversion of its military industry to civilian industry? To what extent will military industry be converted to civilian production?

[Churkin] While I cannot give an accurate forecast right now, the START accord will certainly serve as one of the factors in accelerating industrial conversion. The Soviet Union has substantially reduced defense expenditures in the last three to four years, and drastic cutbacks were imposed on the nation's output of primary armaments. To accelerate industrial conversion, the Soviet side will improve relations with Western nations, especially those with Japan. Japanese and U.S. delegations are currently visiting the Soviet Union, and such exchanges will greatly contribute to future international relations.

[Hirano] Another question: Did the Soviet side make any undesirable concessions in the START negotiations to obtain economic assistance from Western nations?

[Churkin] Absolutely not. There is no connection between the two issues, and both the Soviet side and the U.S. side have never tried to discuss the two issues together. G-7 nations decided to invite the Soviet leaders only two months ago, and the START has been discussed for a much longer period of time.

[Kobayashi] President Gorbachev's meetings with G-7 leaders are now the object of world attention. From your observations of the president in the past couple of days, is he planning any new proposals for the meetings?

[Churkin] In my personal view, new proposals are likely to be made during positive exchanges of opinions. Such proposals may be made from any side. President Gorbachev's recent letters to G-7 leaders has provided outlines of focal points, and all sides will discuss their pending questions such as the Soviet Union's economic potential, and the G-7 nations' assistance to the Soviet side.

[Hirano] We are looking forward to the START signing ceremony in Moscow later this month. Thank you very much, Mr. Churkin.

Officials Comment on START Treaty

Karpov: Treaty 'Important'

LD1707163591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Text] There is another event that is widely being discussed today in the media. It is the considerable headway made in the last few days in preparing the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons. Anticipating the signing of this document, many newspapers have already started counting how much and what items the sides will have to reduce. Our commentator, Vladimir Pasko, asked Karpov, one of the leading specialists in the sphere of arms control and USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, about this. Here is what he said:

[Begin Karpov recording] We will reduce warheads from approximately 10,000 to 6,000, while the United States will go from approximately 13,000 to 6,000, they will have to reduce more warheads. Regarding the means of delivery, it is the other way around. We will reduce from 2,400 to 1,600 while the United States will reduce from approximately 2,200 to 1,600. There is a thorough balance of interests, which allows one to say that such parity as has been attained, a strategic parity, will be registered in the treaty and will become a legally based norm of mutual relations between the United States and the USSR. I view the future treaty as important. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Official

OW1807065691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 17 Jul 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The problem of the firing weight of missiles, which remains unresolved in the framework of the Strategic Arms Treaty, needs a political solution, despite its largely technical nature. This was an opinion expressed by a disarmament expert from the USA and Canada Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Experts can give their precise recommendations in time for today's (July 17) meeting in London between President Gorbachev and President Bush. However, according to the Soviet expert, the last word should be left to politicians, either presidents or ministers.

In a DP [Diplomatic Panorama] interview a Foreign Ministry representative said that the given problem was only superficially technical and that in fact it should for a range of serious points "concerning the national security of both the USSR and the USA." [sentence as received] It is encouraging to note however, that this problem is not as great as the already settled one on the question of telemetrics. There is, therefore, the possibility that it could be settled quickly, especially on the

basis of the experience of agreement on all the other points of the Strategic Arms Treaty.

Karpov Explains Treaty Issues

LD1807210391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1635 GMT 18 Jul 91

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov by Vladimir Pasko, in Moscow on 16 July—recorded]

[Text] [Pasko] Good day, comrades. Our attention today is drawn to the USSR president's talks with the leaders of the leading Western countries regarding the inclusion of the Soviet Union in world economic relations on the basis of the rules accepted in the world economy. However, there is another theme which is being discussed in a lively way, namely, the progress of the Soviet Union and the United States in preparing a treaty on reducing strategic offensive armaments. After a little over nine years of very difficult routine work, which involved politicians, diplomats, the military, scientists and specialists in various spheres—work which without exaggeration was followed with secret hopes in both capitals and was accompanied by dramatic disputes and even the slamming of doors—it seems that the sides have entered the finishing straight.

It was announced yesterday that the final issues have been resolved, and this makes it possible to present the treaty for signing. Let me say frankly that those who were following this subject were expecting such an announcement, nevertheless it did come as a surprise. The progress toward a treaty had been too difficult. Even a few days ago, just one issue but a very complex one, needing to be resolved, lay in its way.

The recorded interview that I want to bring to your attention was made the day before yesterday when the issue that I mentioned had not yet been resolved. Now it no longer remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, the interview in question has not lost its topicality and interest. It gives one, to a great extent, an idea of the work that has been accomplished, its complexity and character, and the importance of what has been achieved.

The interview is with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov, one of the leading specialists in the arms control field and a person who may be said to have devoted his whole life to this problem and who knows it better than anyone.

Viktor Pavlovich, I would like to hear from you rather specifically: What accords have been reached, and what do they mean for us and for the concluding of a treaty?

[Karpov] Indeed, what was really the last barrier on the path to signing a treaty on strategic arms has been crossed. One issue remains—a technical issue which requires expert analysis, analysis precisely of the technical aspect of the matter, as I should say, of the

technology of missile-building. It is a question of fixing the boundary at which any increase in the throw weight of a missile signifies not modernization, but the transforming of that missile into a new type of ballistic missile. That's what the whole issue is about. Here there are a great many technical parameters which determine the index of throw weight—missile power, distance to which the missile is launched. If you launch a missile to a distance of say, 7,000 km, you can give it a greater effective load than if you launch it to 11,000 km. So all these questions to do with both the criteria of specification and the comparison of the throw weight of the missiles which are being tested are now preventing us from reaching a final solution to this issue. Further work would need to be done by the experts, and it is being done by us now in Moscow, and I hope also by the experts in Washington.

In my view these questions can be solved, but we need to weigh up all the initial data, all the initial premises on which we can build a final solution that will enable us to precisely determine both the indices of throw weight and the comparison of them with the weight categories of existing missiles, and determine whether the missiles being tested have crossed this borderline dividing modernized missiles from missiles of a new type.

The other criteria have been agreed upon: For example, if the number of stages of a missile is changed, it already comes into the category of a missile of a new type. And if the launch weight of a missile is changed, then the situation is clear; and if the dimensions of a missile are changed by more than 10 percent, length and so on—so these parameters have been agreed upon. There remains throw weight, we have still to agree on this parameter.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, now when there is practically only one question to be agreed on, it is possible to talk about—and the Western press is already writing about it—the treaty itself, which will be ready any time now. It has been prepared for a long time, for nine years.

[Karpov] Yes, even longer.

[Pasko] And everyone is likely to have forgotten what this treaty will bring, and what it means.

[Karpov] It means that firm limits will be introduced on the number of means delivering nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and on the number of warheads themselves. The same levels are being established for the United States and for the Soviet Union as regard intercontinental ground-launched ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers. The total level is established at 1,600 items. You can vary different categories of missiles within the framework of this level, you can choose between bombing aviation and missiles. But the limit is 1,600 items for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The limit for nuclear warheads is 6,000 for both the United States and the USSR. At the same time a sublimit of 4,900 items is being established

for ballistic missiles. Neither the United States nor the USSR can have more ballistic missiles than the sublimit. The number of strategic bombers cannot exceed 1,100. So those were the main parameters. You also have a whole range of additional statements which concern, let's say, undeployed missiles, limits for mobile missiles, limits for undeployed missiles which are the part of mobile missile launchers, and so on and so forth. So in other words, there are the whole systems of such limits which apply to the United States and the USSR and which give an opportunity to insure, I should say, the predictability of military potential of both sides for the period of the treaty, which is 15 years.

These provisions envisage not only measures of limitation, they envisage a whole range of additional provisions that make the verification [kontrol] system easier and that give both the United States and the USSR the possibility of having a clear concept of whether the other side is observing the provisions of the treaty.

These verification measures envisage a system of constant observation of the production of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles in both the USSR and the United States. They envisage a quota system of verification depending on the number of installations subject to verification on a regular basis. They also envisage a system of applying verification on demand without the right of refusal in those cases where there is serious suspicion that the other side is not observing the provisions. That is, there is a system that allows the opportunity to be completely sure, in my view, that we shall have a clear idea that the United States is observing the provisions of the treaty, and the United States will have equal opportunities.

That is the essence of the treaty—to reduce the present quantity of warheads and means of delivery. We will reduce warheads approximately from 10,000 down to 6,000, and the United States approximately from 13,000 down to 6,000. They will have to reduce more warheads. Regarding means of delivery, it is the other way around: we will reduce from 2,400 down to 1,600, while the United States, approximately, from 2,200 down to 1,600. It will have to make smaller cuts in means of delivery but greater cuts in warheads. So, there is a thorough balance of interests that enables one to say that the parity that has been attained, a strategic parity, will be registered in the treaty and will already become a legally based norm of mutual relations between the United States and the USSR. Therein I see the importance of the future treaty.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, initially what was under discussion was reducing strategic offensive armaments by 50 percent. Then there was a slight change in this ratio, and accord went over to 30 percent. What was the reason for this?

[Karpov] In the process of agreeing upon specific values, account was taken of the interests of insuring the national security of the United States and the USSR. The

figure of 1,600 means of delivery and 6,000 nuclear warheads was acknowledged by both sides as the optimal solution at the present stage, for it insures that it will be possible for both the USSR and the United States to retain a counterstrike potential; that is, a counterstrike potential that can survive even if the other side makes a nuclear first strike against our strategic forces. A sufficient quantity of means will remain from what is now retained under the treaty for us to be able to inflict a counterstrike against the territory of the United States that will be a catastrophe for the United States; that is, there is no sense in making a first strike. In essence, the treaty excludes a first strike as a possibility for winning a war. At the present stage, this correlation of nuclear warheads and means of delivery is the optimal one.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, if one proceeds from the accords that have been reached of late—I am referring to the provisions that both sides do not regard each other as enemies and exclude that possibility of the outbreak not only of nuclear war but also of conventional war—how can one compare these provisions with what you have just said, with the calculations on which the present treaty is based? Is it not lagging behind life and behind the times?

[Karpov] I understand your question, and such questions do arise. But the whole point is I think that we should be gradual in our construction of the new system of relations with the United States and with other NATO countries. As yet we are only just beginning the construction of this new basis.

The treaty on strategic armaments will, as it were, create the material guarantee that nuclear war between the USSR and the United States is impossible. The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe leads gradually... it is the first stage of the transition to the position in which conventional war between NATO and the USSR also becomes impossible, when it will be possible to move on to a way of organizing the armed forces of both the NATO countries and the USSR that would exclude the possibility of conducting large-scale offensive operations; that is, of unleashing major military operations.

The combination of restrictions on strategic armaments with reductions in conventional armaments is already creating a new stage in relations among the USSR, United States, and other NATO countries.

And this is precisely the meaning of the fact that in my view the foundations are now being laid on both sides—by NATO and by us—for further talks in Vienna, where now what is called Vienna-1A is discussing the question of reducing the personnel, not only the arms as written in the Paris treaty, but now the personnel. Evidently, after the Helsinki summit next year there will be the next stage of the Vienna talks which should now lead to a more radical restructuring of the armed forces of the parties to the talks, of all 35 European states—a restructuring that would lead to a further removal of tension, a further reduction of the offensive potential of the armed forces

of member countries, and to the creation of a new system of security combined with new general European institutions, the germ of which we already have—in the Center for the Prevention of Conflict, the secretariat of the CSCE, and other such consultative institutions meetings of foreign ministers of the CSCE.

But I think that gradually we shall get to the point of creating a more ramified permanent system of bodies that will provide the possibility of rapid communications of information, and an automatic network based in The Hague is already being set up, which will link all 35 capitals and will relay information to the center in The Hague, from there it will be rapidly distributed to all the countries via automatic communication lines using computers, and thus a system of operational information is set up. By endowing the Center for the Prevention of Conflict, in the future, with broader and more specific functions, we shall be able to start building a new system of rapid notification and rapid decision-making which could start a mechanism for the real prevention of conflict in Europe.

[Pashko] In other words, as far as I understand it, this treaty is a kind of material foundation of the political decisions that have been taken.

[Karpov] Perfectly correct. But this is probably only the first stage, for we already have the joint Soviet-U.S. declaration of 1 June last year, signed by the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union, which sets the aim of continuing negotiations after the conclusion of the strategic arms treaty, negotiations that are intended to lead to the establishment of a new system of strategic stability, primarily in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the field of strategic potentials. The chief meaning of this is the creation of even greater material guarantees that a nuclear war will not be unleashed in one way or another. The main way of doing this is to reduce the concentration, to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and to reduce their concentration on strategic delivery systems. We are, essentially, already including this element now in the decisions that are being taken under the treaty, when we talk about cutting the numbers to 6,000. One way or another, the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, each one of them, is being reduced. For example, if we had the SS-M-18 missile, as it is called in the NATO classification, a sea missile, it used to have seven warheads, but now we have already reconfigured it to take three warheads, and it will now carry three warheads. In other words, as you see, there is already a reduction.

[Pashko] That is happening on our side, but are there identical examples on the U.S. side?

[Karpov] Yes, the Americans are also intending to reconfigure their Minuteman-3 missiles to take one warhead instead of three. In other words they are also planning to reduce the concentration of warheads on their ballistic missiles. Their sea missile, the Trident-2, was tested with 12 warheads, but it is now being deployed with eight

warheads. So, as we can see, they are also pursuing a trend toward reducing the number of warheads on one missile.

The idea is to further develop these improvements, and that will lead to a reduction in the value, as it were, of each delivery system. In other words, it will not attract first-strike weapons, because one will first have to take a look at whether there are enough nuclear warheads to be sure of knocking out the other side's retaliatory strike weapons. Movement along this road, the road of reducing the concentration of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems, in connection with the reduction of the actual number of nuclear warheads altogether, is the way which, in our view, will make it possible to create an even more stable atmosphere in the strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States.

[Pasko] General Moiseyev, commander of the general staff, has expressed a high opinion of the treaty which is being prepared, stressing that it is fully in accord with the interests of the national security of the Soviet Union. One must assume that he had in mind this very aspect of the question which you have just spoken of.

[Karpov] He was not specific about what he had in mind, but I think he did have this aspect in mind, certainly, since in the course of just over nine years that the talks have been in progress, of course all this has been weighed more than once, all this has been discussed, on our side, all the positions from which the delegations, or foreign ministers, started out at the talks with the Americans, they have been thoroughly studied—at inter-departmental conferences, by the groups of experts. In other words, all that has now been enshrined in the draft treaty is in accord with our interests and security. There is no doubt about this and I think this is what General Moiseyev had in mind.

[Pasko] In other words, as I understand it, our interest in this case is not in the threats that we pose to the Americans by our armaments, but in the reduction of the threats that are directed against us.

[Karpov] Certainly, the United States will be forced to cut the number of their warheads from 13,000 to 6,000.

[Pasko] Thank you very much. [end of interview]

[Pasko] What you have just heard is only a first reaction, a first appraisal of what has been achieved. About the treaty, the text of which, as I understand it, is now in the hands of the translators, I don't doubt that a great deal will be done, both in general and in detail. I will now merely quote the words that the USSR president said yesterday at the press conference in London: Fatigue and obvious lack of time determined the laconic nature of the assessment; the president was dealing with the political significance of what had been achieved. This is good news not just for today, he said; it shows that despite all the difficulties, important changes are taking place in the world—changes which are yielding results that we never even dreamed of a few years ago.

Bush Taking 'Dual Position' on Arms Cuts

*PM 1907154191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jul 91 First Edition p 3*

[By Aleksandr Golts under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Sowers of Hostility Rearing Their Heads"]

[Text] This week's events in London and Washington demonstrate that mankind is fast learning to overcome confrontation and mutual misunderstanding in precisely the way that it once learned to overcome the Atlantic Ocean separating the two capitals. Indeed, no matter how you view the results of the meeting of the seven Western countries' leaders with USSR President Gorbachev (a detailed analysis of this event is still awaited), it is absolutely clear that new foundations are being laid in the British capital for global mutual relations in the world, and that the Soviet Union is assigned the role not of an opponent but of a partner.

What are the results of the work done in Washington by USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh, Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and their U.S. colleagues? In just four days of intensive talks, solutions were found to two problems which nine whole years of talks on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty could not resolve. Meanwhile, at the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush in London, the following step was taken. The road to reducing the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals will be opened. That made it possible to schedule the Soviet-U.S. summit for the end of July.

In recent days, however, a trend has appeared which is attracting closer attention. Let us give the floor to the Soviet foreign minister, who has just held extraordinarily successful talks. "I have the impression," A.A. Bessmertnykh noted, "that certain circles hostile to the USSR, who had at one time quieted down, are now raising their heads again. Once again I have heard certain people: They were keeping silent and now suddenly have begun speaking up again, and furthermore from the same positions as before." Is this a subjective impression? Not at all.

Now it is clear to see that, as progress is made toward the conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons and toward the Soviet-U.S. summit, those people in Washington who do not want the further improvement of relations with our country have become more active. Clearly planned slander campaigns follow one after the other. In essence they attempt to prove that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted even now. THE WASHINGTON TIMES, for example, has been carrying blatant fabrications based on information from spy satellites claiming that the USSR had chemical weapons dumps on German territory and is now covertly evacuating them. Senators Helms and Wallop, well known for their negative attitude to all Soviet-U.S. accords, are trying to prove that our country supplied the United

States with incorrect information during the preparation of the strategic offensive arms treaty.

Although quite prosaic, the reason for the upsurge in such activity is very substantial. It "amounts" to almost \$300 billion. It concerns the Pentagon budget, which is presently undergoing quite difficult scrutiny in the Congress. You can understand the congressmen campaigning for the reduction of military spending. Indeed, why spend money on hyperexpensive arms systems designed to be used opposing the Soviet Union when that opposition itself is clearly receding. For example, the House of Representatives refused to allocate \$3.2 billion for the production of the very latest B-2 strategic bomber created using stealth technology. A technology which, in the Pentagon experts' opinion, makes the plane invisible to radar.

And this despite the fact that the military department specially organized for legislators some highly secret demonstrations of aviation equipment using that technology: In addition to the B-2, the display at the Edwards Air Force Base included a fighter-bomber and even a "top secret" cruise missile. However, even that did not convince the legislators.

There is an equally contradictory attitude in the U.S. establishment to what remains of the "Star Wars" program. Namely, the "brilliant pebbles" project which, as is well known, envisages deploying a large number of small, independently targeted missiles in space. Now that program is going to be joined by another—GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes). As far as can be judged, this concerns the deployment of ground-based theater anti-missile missiles using satellites. It is due to be deployed in 1996. The idea was developed as a result of the effective operation, in the Pentagon's opinion, of the Patriot system during the Gulf War. GPALS will cost approximately \$46 billion.

"Some people even find it hard to say," THE WASHINGTON POST said ironically, "what threat this system is supposed to ward off. The impression is created that basically we are talking about some insane Soviet submarine commander who wakes up one morning, has a cup of lousy coffee, and decides to launch a missile strike against New York." However, this uncertainty does not prevent even President Bush from regarding the B-2 and GPALS as priority programs. Furthermore, he states that he will veto the draft budget if it does not mention financing these programs. Why, the author of THE WASHINGTON POST article asks, is the President, who is preparing to sign the strategic offensive arms treaty envisaging strategic arms reduction, campaigning for a program which, in many people's opinion, would be in clear violation of the ABM Treaty. The whole point is that "it is absolutely clear" to the U.S. President "who the enemy is. It is the right wing of his own party, which will rise up and destroy him if he completely abandons the most magnificent folly of all Ronald Reagan's defense lunacies."

These are harsh words, indeed, but at the same time it is impossible to believe that serious U.S. politicians consider the deployment of such arms systems necessary for national security. Clearly those who represent the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex still exercise a certain influence on the activity of the top echelons of power. An excellent illustration of this dual position is provided by Bush's speech to members of the defense readiness association, which brings together representatives of the arms business.

The U.S. leader expressed a number of ideas which, I think, do him credit. "You do not need a degree in accountancy or a whole chestful of medals," Bush remarked, "to understand that in present conditions every penny that we spend on unnecessary defense components will be to the detriment of the durability of our defense. I know that budget cuts are going to be painful. However, we must set new priorities for ourselves and concentrate solely on the most important, absolutely essential programs. I would also like to warn that our efforts must correspond to national interests and national requirements, not the narrow interests of individual sectors and corporations."

You cannot disagree with that, but those threats to national security which the President lists make you doubt the sincerity of his words. It turns out that the threat to the United States is represented by centers of instability, by "despots" armed with modern weapons and the ambitions of the past. And here, in my view, is where the blatant chicanery occurs. However hard you try you cannot find in the world the kind of despots whom you would need to fight in a war using B-2 strategic bombers or all kinds of variations on the SDI theme. There are not many countries in the world capable of launching a strike against U.S. territory.

But the new programs, it seems to me, are the compromise the U.S. administration is offering the military-industrial complex in exchange for certain planned Pentagon budget cuts. But this compromise is far from innocuous. After all, the arms systems in question require a completely new adversary, and the President is already stating that the Soviet Union "remains a military superpower with a constantly improving military machine and a program containing many arms systems." To be frank, the appeal to the Senate to adopt the kind of budget that would enable the "next war" to be waged sounds quite frightening in this context.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the London meeting. It seems to me that the G-7 are in no hurry to grant large-scale credits to the USSR. This was not because the participants in the conference were not convinced by the USSR president's ideas on the structural reorganization of the economy. The captains of capitalism decided to wait until the plans for transition to the market begin to be implemented. That is understandable. Meanwhile, U.S. President Bush, talking about the forthcoming meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in the British capital, promised to try to convince him that

"the Soviet military have nothing to fear from the United States." But the Soviet military, as I understand it, prefer, just like Western leaders, to operate not on the basis of the partner's words and plans but of his actions.

Foreign Ministry Officials Comment on Treaty Final Draft

*OW2207082791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 19 Jul 91*

[*"Diplomatic Panorama" report by Mikhail Mayorov: "Soviet Diplomats: Superpowers Find START Treaty Acceptable"; transmitted via KYODO*]

[Text] Officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department for Arms Control and Disarmament speaking on Friday have said that the final draft of a strategic arms treaty due to be signed in Moscow later this month has been found to be suitable both by the Soviet Union and the United States as well as by their military. They said the foreign and defence ministries had always worked in close touch over the treaty for all of nine years and had never had any differences. "No unilateral decision has ever been taken", said one ministry expert describing as "idle talk" Soviet and world media allegations about differences between the two departments.

Foreign Ministry officials told an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent that most of the Soviet military were well aware about the negative effects from further strategic arms race to the society and themselves. However, they did not rule out a negative response from some military such as colonels Petrushenko and Alksnis "who always look for loose points in any agreement". They always give a false assessment of each disarmament-related paper because of "being misled by numbers involved". But in reality, the balance of forces is determined by a whole range of other factors that are not reflected in the paper rather than by the number of warheads or delivery vehicles the sides are committed to reduce.

The Treaty Provides for Less Than 50 Percent Cut in Strategic Weapons

Soviet diplomats said it would be more correct to describe the treaty as envisaging a 30%-40% reduction in long range missiles instead of halving them as planned in 1995. They said the parameters provided by the agreement had since changed and it would now be wrong to speak in terms of exact numbers of superpower missiles to be scrapped. The process is to be spread over 7 years and the uncertainty is caused by further plans for defence and disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States. "Any figure is optional", said one disarmament expert. The Start treaty provides for three stages, with precise numbers being set for what and when must be eliminated.

Verification

The issue was one of the thorniest during the discussions of the treaty. Away from a matter of detail, said Soviet diplomats, the verification procedure is similar to that of the INF agreement which provided for the total elimination of medium range missiles but the START Treaty envisages a 30% -40% cut in long-range missiles taken in three stages. This places the need for wider and more ramified verification measures at each stage over a period of 7 years.

The Size of the Document

The blueprint is about 1000 pages long, both in Russian and English, but can be halved after experts in Geneva have finished verifying both texts. But even then, said Soviet diplomats, it will be the largest paper yet in the history of bilateral relations.

From Geneva 1 to Geneva 2

Immediately after the START treaty is signed, the superpowers are expected to set down to consultations and talks on further cuts in strategic weapons in line with last June's agreement reached by presidents Gorbachev and Bush.

New U.S. Nuclear Targeting Plan Criticized

WASHINGTON POST Cited

PM2407081591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Jul 91 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Targeted by Pentagon"]

[Text] Washington, 21 July—The United States has prepared a renewed plan for missile strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of the outbreak of nuclear war. Recently approved by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, it envisages engaging 7,000 targets on Soviet territory. This is reported today by THE WASHINGTON POST, citing ranking U.S. officials.

The new list of targets reflects the considerable political improvements of late to strengthen global international security, and it excludes around 3,000 targets sited mainly in East Europe. The new war plans also take account of the provisions of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, which should be signed by the Soviet and U.S. leaders this month.

Nonetheless, the United States is still envisaging the complete destruction, for instance, of such a major Soviet republic as the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], with the help of the 5,000 nuclear warheads targeted on it—each of which is considerably more powerful than the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In the words of some unnamed officials: "Some important changes were made to the secret war plans last

October. Many significant changes should come into effect in two and a half months."

And although the revised list of targets contains fewer names than previous versions, THE WASHINGTON POST stresses, it still demonstrates that the Pentagon strategists are utilizing criteria of the "cold war" period.

Plan Called 'Cruel Absurdity'

PM2507080591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Jul 91 Union Edition p 4

[By V. Nadein: "Military Still Lagging Behind Politics"]

[Text] Washington—The Pentagon is revising the list of priority targets for nuclear strikes in the event of nuclear conflict with the USSR.

Republic Communist Party Central Committees and CPSU kray and oblast committees are henceforth no longer primary targets for U.S. missiles in the event of nuclear war. Communists' political influence in the Soviet Union, U.S. strategists believe, has declined to such an extent that it is better to save the nuclear warheads for something more substantial. For a strike against the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, for instance.

On the eve of the signing of the strategic arms reduction treaty, planned for the end of July in Moscow, U.S. military planners have just finished their latest revision of the targets for priority strikes in the event of a nuclear conflict.

Usually such revisions are done every October. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, last year they featured few major changes. The military are guided by a three-page political directive code-named NSDD-13 and signed by President Reagan at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations were at their nadir in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan.

The Reagan directive, which has not subsequently been revised either by President G. Bush or by Defense Secretary R. Cheney, is based on the deterrence principle and obliges the U.S. Armed Forces to deliver a rapid retaliatory strike guaranteed to hit the most important military and civil sectors of the USSR.

The treaty to be signed by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush envisages a reduction in strategic potential. Within the framework of the preparations for this treaty the former U.S. list is being reduced by 3,000 targets. But 7,000 targets will basically remain unchanged.

The changes in East Europe made it inexpedient, in the U.S. side's opinion, to continue targeting those countries' territories, and, to a certain extent, this also applies to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. THE WASHINGTON POST claims that this decision is connected not so much with the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons from

these regions as it is with the fact that, in the event of conflict, these countries' governments will refuse to participate in the Soviet Union's military efforts.

Even after the treaty is signed the largest quantity of nuclear warheads—more than 5,000—will remain targeted on the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], which the Americans consider the Soviet Union's main arsenal and decisionmaking center.

All the details of the new nuclear war plan were worked out on computers at Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha. Located deep underground, the "air room"—the intellectual and nerve center of the entire headquarters—contains detailed maps and mockups of targets in the USSR in order to calculate the time needed to launch the required number of missiles, and their heights and trajectories. Only the U.S. President, who is accompanied on all his travels by a high-ranking military officer carrying a secret briefcase, is entitled to order a nuclear strike. However, a number of U.S. legislators claim that the Omaha center has been given too many powers in determining the size and targeting of the strike, and that the plan is excessively brutal in a way that is not justified by military requirements.

Many recognized experts have called for a one-third reduction in the list of targets in the USSR. This, in their opinion, would make it possible to halve the U.S. strategic arsenal and save huge amounts of money. So far the military have succeeded in defending their position on the basis of the deterrence doctrine.

The missile strike plans worked out by the nuclear strategists and recently obtained by THE WASHINGTON POST are set out in a reasonable way and come complete with views which outwardly seem entirely logical. However, it takes no great effort to see how rapidly the plans for nuclear retaliation are lagging behind the political realities of the day and are turning into a cruel absurdity.

Since there are "not enough" targets in the USSR for existing nuclear weapons (or for those which will be left after the Moscow treaty is signed), the list includes not only civilian targets—whose military value is dubious—but also undoubtedly worthless targets. These include, for instance, silos from which missiles will already have been launched in the event of a Soviet attack.

The RSFSR, which is the target for half the U.S. nuclear arsenal, recently won special praise from President G. Bush during B.N. Yeltsin's visit to the United States. There is a nightmarish contradiction between Bush's admission that the Russians have shown a "devotion to democratic values and free-market principles" and the terrifying Omaha list which includes every rayon center of even the slightest importance.

Judging by U.S. press statements, the strategic arms treaty is unlikely in the near future to be continued in the direction of new cuts in both countries' nuclear potential. It is not a question of the experts, who are naturally

tired from their exhausting negotiations, nor is it a question of the parliaments where the new agreements will have to undergo major checks: Judging by everything, there will be severe criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. And the criticism will most probably be similar in reproaching the two governments for allowing the treaty to favor the other side.

Today the traditional reasons for the use of strategic weapons—a nuclear attack on U.S. territory or an attack on West Europe—are becoming practically unbelievable. On the one hand, even glasnost in the Soviet Union—without having turned into a free press yet—is reducing the military need for the use of missiles. For example, the greater openness in publications has allowed U.S. intelligence to establish the vital importance of certain high-voltage power lines in supplying power to cities.

The change in plans is the result. People in the "air room" are retargeting missile strikes from power stations located in densely populated areas to power lines.

Although there is a veil of secrecy over nuclear missiles in the United States, legislators and the press are privy to a considerable amount of important information. It would be an exaggeration to compare the power of public opinion with the power of a destructive thermonuclear missile. But it would also be naive to fail to see how much more information ordinary Americans have, compared with us, allowing them to arrive at an informed opinion about ballistic missiles, bombs, B-2 stealth bombers, and other insanely expensively and totally useless rubbish.

The list of targets compiled by the Soviet command is hardly likely to be any more humane or logical. And, of course, the new treaty constitutes not just an alluring symbol but a real reduction in the threat.

Signing of Strategic Arms Treaty Previewed

'Happy End' To 'Hard Work'

*LD2207153491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 22 Jul 91*

[Text] A little more than a week remains before the Soviet-American summit in Moscow. Here is a commentary by Yuri Solton:

The happy end of the summit seems to be programmed. There is an understanding that the Soviet and American Presidents will sign a treaty which has taken experts 10 years of hard work to prepare.

The treaty concerns strategic arms—the very core of the two countries' nuclear arsenals. Not only will their race be restricted; 30 percent will be eliminated.

Even if the Moscow summit were to focus on this issue alone, it could be considered historic. But more than 10 agreements to develop Soviet-American contacts will also be signed and world problems will come under discussion.

No sensational joint statements are likely to emerge, though the possibility exists. But what is important is that President Gorbachev and President Bush will have an opportunity for natural and easy talks to clarify each other's positions or the most acute issues and decide on ways to expand cooperation on the international arena. The two presidents have developed a business-like and trustful relationship, obviously because of a sense of responsibility for the fate of the world and this has helped to channel Soviet-American relations in the right direction.

Clearly it's no mere accident that on the eve of the summit, THE WASHINGTON POST reports that Defense Secretary Dick Cheney has approved a new version of the plan for missile attacks on the Soviet Union should a nuclear war get started. According to this plan 7,000 targets in the Soviet Union would be hit. Though the number of targets has decreased, even the American newspaper remarks that Pentagon officials still think in cold war terms.

When two countries have missiles targeted against each other, it's difficult to speak of them as allies. But it's important that the focus in relations has shifted from mutual threat of nuclear war to the search for confidence-building measures and compromises that can help avoid confrontation. And this in turn is moving the whole world towards new relations. Most certainly a constructive dialogue at the summit in Moscow should help to improve the entire international situation.

History of Talks Viewed

LD2207152691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1130 GMT 22 Jul 91

[Commentary by Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] Just over a week is left until the forthcoming Soviet-American summit in Moscow during which a treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is expected to be signed. I will remind you that the time limits for this were elaborated during the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in London. And now for our commentary by Nikolay Agayants:

[Agayants] For nine long years, overcoming all kinds of obstacles and barriers and the obstructions of the mournful memory of the cold war, the Soviet Union and the United States have moved forward to meet each other half way, neither unsteadily nor shakily, with a view to concluding a historic document, a treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Talks. Moreover, in the last year, when exclusively technical details remained, unexpected failures began and accord could not be achieved at all. But it is true that after every new meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, certain progress was noted and there were new steps forward but the obstacles in the way of a final understanding were not removed and the date of the Moscow summit hung in the air. And this agitation has been left behind. The Soviet

and American delegations in Geneva have been given instructions to prepare the text of a treaty for signing in Moscow, that's to say, essentially, to perform a great deal of work within very short time limits. After all, the experts still must polish the legal formulas and agree on the English and Russian versions of the document, which is over 1,000 pages long. In a word, a landmark solution is approaching which is extremely important not just for us and for the Americans but for the whole of mankind, too. The implementation of it will depend, in many ways, not just upon the firmness of the Soviet leadership, but upon the position by our military and the so-called jingoists who, in the past few months, under the pretext of defending the fatherland and strengthening its defense capability, have been waging, with a plain dealing that is dispiriting, a campaign against many political accords achieved by Gorbachev. Hence a certain inconsistency by the Kremlin at the talks with U.S. representatives, the departure from previously agreed positions, and the dithering about [sharakhaniye uz storony b storonu] which, in the end, led to the START reduction of 50 percent, which was thought of earlier, is so far limited to 30 percent.

But we won't fall into a depression. Things really have begun to get moving. The forthcoming Soviet-American summit, to all appearances, will not be just a ceremonial one. Several more serious bilateral agreements, including in the sphere of economic cooperation, now are being elaborated and prepared for signing. But the most important thing is that the Moscow-Washington dialogue at the highest level, which was begun in Geneva six years ago, will be continued.

More Radical Approach to Disarmament Urged

PM2707093591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jul 91 Union Edition p 5

[Georgiy Arbatov "Academic's Opinion" under the rubric "On the Eve of the USSR and U.S. Presidents' Meeting": "An Opportunity Not To Be Missed"]

[Text] The two great powers have finally agreed on a summit meeting. They agreed after rather long and agonizing efforts—longer and more agonizing than might have been expected or was warranted by the state of Soviet-U.S. relations. But be that as it may, the obstacles have now been removed and the meeting is to take place.

In this context, I will venture to express certain ideas and make certain suggestions.

Two possible scenarios for the meeting can be imagined:

The first is that it might turn out to be an essentially ceremonial event, albeit a very prominent one, attracting lengthy media attention. There is nothing really wrong in that—the meeting has been carefully prepared and major questions, including the treaty on strategic offensive arms [START], have been resolved in advance. It remains merely to formalize these accords in Moscow.

Under the second scenario, the meeting is not just another symbol of the end of the "cold war," but also marks the transition to a new stage in relations between the two countries and international relations in general, in that sense a real milestone.

Naturally, I would prefer the second version. Because history has seen too many examples where disasters have occurred in international affairs, where states have gone into decline and even perished, not so much because of serious errors and mistakes as because of missed opportunities. They must not be amassed, alas, in the way the miserly knight amassed the gold, but must be used as soon as they appear—the opportunity is here today, but tomorrow it is gone, if not forever, then for a long time.

A fundamental change has occurred in Soviet-U.S. relations. Serious, honest, normal people in America have come to the conclusion that there is no "Soviet threat" to the United States, and there is no overseas "evil empire" either. Likewise, serious, honest, normal people in the USSR have come to the conclusion that the United States does not intend to attack them or "blow the country up" from within.

Will the treaty on strategic offensive arms mark this radical change eloquently enough? Hardly.

A 30-percent reduction of nuclear weapons would have been unachievable, of course, at the height of the cold war. Especially with the guarantees and verification measures the treaty stipulates.

At the same time, this treaty still falls far short of the new political realities. If both the United States and the USSR have no more enemies in the world—or at any rate enemies prepared to use nuclear weapons—then how does this square with the 12,000 (or, in fact, if "liberal" counting rules are used, the 15,000) strategic warheads permitted under the treaty? Not to mention the fact that, under the treaty, it is almost exclusively old types of weapons that are cut, while there are virtually no restrictions placed on the development [razrabotka] of new weapons. Does the other treaty—on conventional arms—which allows the USSR to retain 13,000 tanks and NATO 20,000 opposing each other in Europe, correspond to the new realities?

I do not want to cast aspersions on these treaties, much less on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was signed in 1987. These conclude an entire phase of relations. They are important, and without them there could have been no progress toward more radical steps. But nonetheless they read more like the last page of the chapter of "cold-war" era relations rather than the first page of a new chapter in our history. A time when attention and effort are being focused on real, rather than old, challenges and threats. History itself will pass judgment on the past. Now it is important to concentrate on the future.

Not the distant future—statements about the great and noble goals that both leaders would like to achieve have

already been made. President G. Bush has repeatedly talked of a "new world order." And President M. Gorbachev has repeatedly talked (as, admittedly, has the U.S. leader in the past) of a "comprehensive security system" and a "nonnuclear and nonviolent world." But how do we get from "cold war" to "new world order?" And what are we to do not in a nonviolent world, but in today's real world when, as events in the Persian Gulf have shown, it is sometimes necessary to resort to force to eradicate violence?

It is to be hoped that the opportunity for a serious discussion of these problems provided by the Moscow summit will not be missed. It is essentially a question of the problems of demilitarizing our societies (after all, the United States is also a highly militarized country) and our relations, along with international relations as a whole.

The START treaty, which will be signed during the summit, provides considerable cause for serious thought about these subjects.

I have already mentioned how the restrictions being brought in on strategic weapons fail to live up to the changes in the world. We should also recall the tortuous preparation of the treaty. In Washington in December 1987, the leaders of both states pledged to sign it by summer 1988. Since then they have made similar promises on another five occasions! But it was only in June 1991, having finally resolved the last "technical matters," that the way was open for its signing. Admittedly, I am not sure that many people will even be able to read the treaty all the way through—after all, because of the technical details, it contains more than 500 pages of text, which in many cases are inaccessible for the "uninitiated."

All these are not secondary details, but rather a symptom of the problems associated with obsolete approaches to disarmament. Because of this, summits and the major, vitally important questions of politics and relations between the two great powers are becoming, as it were, hostage to technical matters that the public and, I fear, the leaders of the two countries are incapable of understanding. Questions, which, I am sure, everyone will have forgotten six months from now—such as the "standard range" [etalonnaya dalnost] of ballistic missiles or the percentage deviation of new types in terms of size [protsent otkloneniye novykh ikh tipov po gabaritam]. I would like to add a rider—I am not calling for these technical details to be ignored. But we cannot make the most important problems of global politics dependent on them, long after admitting that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that no such war should be fought.

Of course, to a certain extent the overblown role of technical details is linked to the complexity of the military hardware on which restrictions are being introduced. But I think that something else is much more important. Distorted decision making processes and mechanisms, reflecting the past realities of total distrust and enmity, emerged during the "cold war" on these

matters, which are critically important for the economic and political well-being of both countries and for their physical survival. These mechanisms, starting from their working levels, allotted the main backstage role in disarmament matters to departments and people whose influence and power depended on the production and number of weapons amassed. While departments of people with a professional interest in seeing negotiations succeed (in our country this would be the Foreign Ministry and diplomats) were left in the minority on the margins of the negotiating process.

All this was natural and tolerable when disarmament played a subordinate role in the policy of safeguarding security. But when life itself is bringing the demilitarization of our countries and their relations to the center of attention, the situation is changing.

Attention is drawn to the fact that specialists (both foreign and Soviet) expressing satisfaction with the fact that work on the treaty has nonetheless been completed are by no means triumphant or jubilant. Quite the reverse, they are expressing doubts: Will both our countries be able to conclude such treaties in the future, expending long years of work and incredible effort on them?

That is why it is so important, despite all the importance of the treaty being signed, for the discussion of disarmament at the coming summit to go far beyond the treaty framework and be a step forward toward a new and untraditional (or, at any rate, rejecting the traditions of the "cold war") approach to disarmament and security.

This seems so important to me for the following reason as well. The contradictions between Soviet-U.S. political and military relations is becoming more and more patent. Whereas the former are developing rapidly and are aimed at the future, military relations between the two countries remain completely rooted in the "cold war." This is creating very serious dangers, and not only foreign policy dangers.

The question of an external threat is closely bound up with internal affairs, largely determining the economic realities, the political "climate" in the country, and its domestic stability. That is why this contradiction cannot persist very long, much less be exacerbated. Either military relations will be brought into line with political relations (this would mark the demilitarization of our countries and their relations) or, conversely, political relations will decline to the level of military relations—under the pressure of obvious domestic forces and problems. There is no other way.

In this sense the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit could be a touchstone.

Any policy, of course, begins at home, and both countries could move a long way down the path of demilitarization by displaying restraint and common sense, and by resorting to unilateral steps in disarmament. But there

are limits here, not just military-strategic limits connected with security, but psychological limits too. Whereas the first limits are still quite far off in the conditions of excessive amounts of armaments, we are constantly coming up against psychological obstacles even now.

Most often there are simply no reasonable grounds for retaining old military programs, much less for producing new ones. Instead of reasonable grounds we usually hear: Look at what the Russians (or, correspondingly, the Americans) are doing!

Here too both sides are equally at fault. In the United States, when it is necessary to justify programs for building new missiles or antimissile missiles, people say that the Soviet Union is the only country with a deployed antimissile defense system and the world's largest ABM [antiballistic missile] system, and that it launches more military satellites and tests more new missiles than anyone else. In similar circumstances, people in the USSR bring up the U.S. SDI program, and the U.S. superiority in aircraft carriers and heavy bombers. When it comes to stopping nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk or on Novaya Zemlya, they refer to the nuclear explosions in Nevada.

The future of disarmament and demilitarization clearly lies in combining unilateral measures with bilateral agreements and talks, but talks and agreements of a new kind, unlike those which emerged during the "cold war" years and were by default more a tool for controlling the arms race than a means of ending it. They then turned into a kind of political tranquilizer, a means of reassuring parliaments and publics, and—as U.S. specialists later admitted—they even became necessary to win large appropriations for weapons.

Here is the sum total: In 1969, when the Soviet-U.S. SALT talks began, the United States had more than 4,700 nuclear warheads and the USSR around 2,000 (the difference mainly being due to the U.S. superiority in heavy bombers). After several agreements, which were rightly considered successful at the time (SALT I, SALT II, and the treaty to be signed at the summit), the United States and the USSR will have 6,000 (and in fact 7,000-8,000) warheads each. And this after 22 years of almost continuous negotiations!

So we need a new model for arms reduction talks, and now is just the time to start developing it. Both in talks with the Americans (why not, for instance, institute regular meetings between the two countries' foreign and defense ministers, a joint conversion commission, and so on), and by improving the decisionmaking mechanism on these issues in our own country. We will probably need some alternative mechanism, too.

In particular, we need to give more real power to the political leadership and less power to the technical experts and the negotiations bureaucracy. We also need

to ensure that the Foreign Ministry plays the leading role in elaborating negotiating positions in interdepartmental groups.

An effective and well-informed legislature should be a very important alternative mechanism. As a USSR people's deputy and chairman of one of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee's subcommittees, I can testify that in the disarmament sphere (and it is indivisible from the defense and foreign policy sphere) this authority does not yet function as an independent participant.

In this regard, there is something we can learn from the United States. The Pentagon and the country's leadership provide Congress with the information it needs and are forced to submit to its decisions. Not because of their high moral qualities or principles. We are probably their equal in this area. There is another reason—under the Constitution and the law they cannot get even a single dollar for military purposes without the permission of Congress. Of course, even in the United States the situation is by no means perfect—there are cases of sharp practice, lying, and scandals—but the system works. And if the foreign-policy situation is going to continue to improve with our help, the Pentagon will find it even harder to deceive Congress and conceal matters from it.

For the moment, however, we have a lot of ground to make up. Of course, progress has been achieved in the last few years, but it has been very insignificant. I fear that it is not just because of a tradition of excessive secrecy that people do not want to reveal information. Departmental interests are protected more easily when departments' activities are cloaked in secrecy. It is precisely a question of departmental interests rather than of the country's interests or the interests of security.

These powerful departments, it must be said, will not just hand over their secrets to legislators, much less the public. Those secrets will have to be won, as will legislative controls over everything, including military spending. People start telling the truth only when they see that it is the only way to get the money. Our young and still not very strong parliament could be helped in this by the USSR president and by the republics, which ultimately have to pay the mind-boggling bills run up by our military-industrial complex. These bills are paid not only with money collected from people in the form of tax, but also with land (according to PRAVDA information, the military department alone controls more than 40 million hectares), the labor of millions of fellow citizens, economic destruction, and the lion's share of natural resources and industrial potential.

The situation is paradoxical. One would have thought that, with the ending of the "cold war" and the disappearance of the "enemy," the arms race would have ended as well. Militarism, however, which was brought up on the "cold war," has developed its own independent self-preservation mechanisms even if it has lost its justification.

The picture is totally irrational. We are appealing for economic aid from the very countries against whose aggression we maintain huge armed forces to combat, undermining our might and vitality and wrecking our national economy. Meanwhile, the West is scared that, in the event of our state breaking up, nuclear weapons will fall into some "wrong hands" instead of being in the hands of those who are currently targeting them on the NATO countries!

Can this theater of the absurd last very long?

One would very, very much like the United States and the USSR, having finished off the "cold war," to seriously tackle the dismantling of its obsolete militarism. Otherwise, the threat to peace and international security could recur again and again.

Diplomats Comment on Completion of Talks in Geneva

Nazarkin on Stability, Defense Conversion

*LD2707195591 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT
27 Jul 91*

[Text] Moscow, July 27 (TASS)—The Soviet and American delegations ended in Geneva today the coordination of the text of the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments. Head of the Soviet delegation Yuriy Nazarkin said in a TV interview that the signing of the treaty will "consolidate military security in the world and will create a more durable political basis for further development of Soviet-American relations."

The Soviet diplomat stressed that the treaty would promote the conversion of the arms-manufacturing industry of the Soviet Union. It will be possible to implement it without any damage to the national security.

U.S., Soviet Representatives Cited

LD2707103991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 27 Jul 91

[Text] Farid Seyful-Mulyakov, our correspondent in Switzerland, visited one of the last sittings of the Geneva talks on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, where the delegations of the USSR and the United States of America were completing their work before the forthcoming Moscow meeting of the presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Seyful-Mulyakov] The conversation with Linton Brooks, the head of the U.S. delegation:

Mr. Brooks, what could you say to sum up the results of the American-Soviet talks, which have lasted nearly 10 years?

I want to make three points, Brooks stressed. First, we have completed a process from which both our countries and the world as a whole will gain greater security.

Second, this success would be unthinkable without the desire of Washington and Moscow to meet one another halfway and to seek ways of agreement. Finally, we have completed a great matter that symbolizes a new kind of mutual understanding and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I am very proud of that, Linton Brooks emphasized.

The conversation with Yuriy Nazarkin, the head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks:

Yuriy Konstantinovich, you have conducted these talks for a number of years. What will it mean for our country?

Both states and the whole of mankind will reduce the level of the military confrontation in which the world has found itself, Nazarkin stresses. It's as though we were on a very dangerous peak of 25,000 warheads and some 5,000 strategic missiles. Now we are going to come down from that dangerous peak. In other words, as a result of the talks, military security in the world will be strengthened. Apart from that, there will be a sounder political basis for the further development of our relations with the United States. Finally, a very important circumstance, Nazarkin emphasized, is that the treaty will assist the conversion of our military industry. Moreover, we will be able to carry it through without any detriment to our security. The whole world awaits the signing in Moscow of the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons by the presidents of the two countries.

U.S. Spokesman Calls Treaty Stabilizing

*LD2707185891 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT
27 Jul 91*

[By correspondent Igor Barsukov]

[Text] Washington, July 27 (TASS)—The Soviet-American treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments, due to be signed during the Soviet-American summit in Moscow, will strengthen strategic stability on a lower level of nuclear armaments. This was stated at a briefing in the White House on Friday by the Bush Administration spokesman, who preferred to remain anonymous. I think it will be just to say that the treaty meets all our main objectives, its provisions are aimed at encouraging the restructuring of the nuclear forces in such a way as to make them more stable and less threatening, he pointed out.

The administration spokesman stressed that the treaty is important because it will lead for the first time to real reductions of strategic nuclear forces by both sides. An unprecedented system of control is one of its advantages. The treaty envisages regular exchanges of information about the strength, location and technical characteristics of weapon systems, which will permit to ensure reliable control over the fulfillment of the treaty.

The administration spokesman told journalists that, in accordance with the statement made by the Soviet and American presidents at the 1990 summit in Washington,

after signing the treaty on strategic offensive armaments the two countries will continue to discuss issues dealing with strategic stability and the correlation between the defensive and offensive weapon systems. Consultations on those issues will begin without delay after the signing of the Moscow treaty on strategic armaments. We certainly intend to fulfil the agreements reached in Washington, he stressed.

The question was asked at the briefing about the continuation by the U.S. of the work dealing with the "strategic defence initiative", specifically, whether or not the deployment of the ground-based anti-ballistic missile system will hamper the reduction of strategic armaments in the future. The spokesman said in this connection that President Bush continued to support the programme of the creation of a global system of protection against nuclear attacks. In his opinion, the deployment of such a system will make it possible to lessen the threat of an unsanctioned or accidental launching of missiles. He said that strategic defence can strengthen security confidence on the lower levels of offensive armaments.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Report on Opening of SCC Session

*LD1607191891 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT
16 Jul 91*

[Text] Geneva, 16 July (TASS)—The Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission [SCC] began its session here today.

The commission was founded in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. memorandum dated December 21, 1972, to promote implementing aims and provisions of Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms reductions and measures to lessen the danger of nuclear war.

Military Radar in Latvia Said To Raise Radiation Levels

*OW1907093591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1500 GMT 18 Jul 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lately the sanitation and epidemics authority in the city of Liepaja measured electromagnetic radiation in the city and found its level is two to three times higher than the admissible one, apparently because there is a radar in the city's southern suburb.

The City Hall has repeatedly approached the command of the Baltic Military District, the USSR Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces with requests to close down or relocate the radar, but all the military did was install a metal screen around the installation.

Senate Committee SDI Vote Reported

*PM1907130191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jul 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Report from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, POST-FACTUM, REUTER, and AFP reports: "Star Wars' Package Adopted"]

[Text] The U.S. Congress Senate Armed Services Committee expressed itself Wednesday in favor of earmarking \$4.6 billion in fiscal 1992 for the implementation of programs within the framework of SDI. By 16 votes to four the senators adopted the so-called "star wars" package which is a component part of the military expenditure bill approved by the committee last week at \$291 billion.

This package provides for the deployment by 1996 of a ground-based ABM system using sensors put into space.

Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has called the package which has been adopted "a very major achievement" since it suggests the plan and schedule for developing an effective ABM system.

U.S. ABM System 'Mine' on START Talks Road

*PM2907085991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jul 91 First Edition p 3*

[Colonel M. Ponomarev article under "Observer's Column" rubric: "A Mine on the Road"]

[Text] On the very same day, 17 July, that Presidents M. Gorbachev and G. Bush were in London surmounting the last obstacle on the road to concluding a treaty on limiting strategic nuclear weapons [START] and agreeing to sign it at another summit meeting in Moscow, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee concluded its discussion of the draft military budget for fiscal 1992. The committee approved it at the sum of \$291 billion.

On the whole this is routine business. Especially as the committee's decision does not signal the end of the process of adopting the budget. It still has to be examined by the entire Senate and coordinated with the version adopted by the House of Representatives. But what attracted the attention of observers was one major addition made by the committee to the bill on military appropriations. It makes provision for the deployment on the continental United States in fiscal 1996 of an ABM [antiballistic missile] system for defense against a limited or unsanctioned launch of enemy ICBM's.

What is at issue here? The Senate Committee session deemed it expedient to site 100 ground-based antimissile missiles at Grand Forks Airbase in North Dakota to protect, according to the intention of the plan's authors, any of the 48 states of the continental United States from nuclear attack. This proposal may acquire the force of

law if it wins support at a session of the full Senate and is ratified by both houses of Congress.

Naturally, the question arises: Why are the heads of the two powers with the greatest military might agreeing to a major reduction in strategic nuclear weapons while American legislators are discussing measures designed to breathe new life into the SDI—a program for ABM defenses with space-based elements whose destabilizing effect on international security has been the subject of mountains of articles and thousands of speeches? Does this mean that, when it comes to the people at the summit of power in the United States, the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing?

Not likely. This is simply further confirmation of the fact that, as before, there are extremely influential forces across the ocean who think it essential to exploit any opportunity for putting additional pressure on the Soviet Union with the aim of dragging it into another round of military expenditure—this time in the sphere of strategic defensive weapons.

That this is indeed the case is obvious from the fact that once again a demand to review the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972 is coming to the fore. The deployment of 100 antimissile missiles at Grand Forks outlined by the Senate Committee does not contravene the letter of this unlimited-duration treaty. But the members of the Senate Committee do not intend to restrict themselves to these antimissile missiles alone. They are insistently recommending that the administration elaborate amendments to the ABM Treaty in order to establish juridical preconditions for constructing additional installations with the aim of deploying several more (about six) ABM system facilities on U.S. territory.

The potentially explosive nature of this new round in the political campaign to review the provisions of the ABM Treaty is obvious. After all, the Soviet Union has stated on a number of occasions that a repudiation of the 1972 treaty will force it to examine the question of stopping the talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons and compel it to look again at the implementation of the agreements reached in this area.

Thus the addition to the bill on the U.S. military budget for fiscal 1992 concerning the deployment of an ABM system adopted by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee by a majority vote (16 to 4) is a mine on the road which the Soviet Union and the United States have been following for nine long years. A mine planted at precisely the moment when both sides have managed to reach the finishing post.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Soviet Arms in Eastern Germany Raise Questions
*91WC0131A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jul 91 p 9*

[Article by Ilya Baranikas and Illarion Olsufyev under "Disarmament" rubric: "In Which Countries, Former

Warsaw Pact Allies of the USSR, Did Nuclear Weapons Remain? We Would Like to Know from Official Soviet Sources"]

[Text] Of what classes? When did they take them out or when will they do so? NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA raised several questions in the scope of this subject as applied to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 6 July 1991). The USSR Ministry of Defense may assess our questions as insufficiently competent but we purposefully did not appeal to American military annuals and CIA reports. We could not, however, get the necessary information from Soviet (including military) sources. We are counting on the Ministry of Defense ceasing to play the game of total secrecy, for it appears that the time has past when our press referred to Soviet aircraft by the NATO nickname "Backfire" and missiles by the designation "SS-20" invented in the United States ("SS" is the abbreviation of the English term "surface-to-surface"). In expecting our military to tell about the fate of Soviet-Czechoslovak nuclear weapons, we at the same time would like to ask them to illuminate the problem of Soviet nuclear warheads in eastern Germany.

From sources worthy of confidence, we learned that the command of the Western Group of Forces did not request permission from the authorities for the transport of fissionable materials. Even if warheads for medium and shorter-range missiles were completely destroyed and none of them was left in the territory of the former GDR, as was foreseen by the Soviet-American INF Treaty of 1987, atomic bombs for aircraft of the same class (that is, with a range of up to 5,500 km) and warheads for short-range nuclear delivery systems (up to 500 km)—aircraft, missiles, and artillery—should logically have remained.

If our military command in Germany really did not turn to the authorities of the FRG about the removal of nuclear weapons, then one may infer one of two things: a) the entire atomic arsenal of the Western Group of Forces is still in Germany; b) the nuclear weapons were taken out by the same means that was used to take Erich Honecker to the USSR—on Soviet military aircraft, from Soviet military airfields, without informing German authorities. The latter version, if it is confirmed, would mean disrespect for the sovereignty of the FRG (which, by the way, is nothing new for our military people: besides the evacuation of Honecker, let us recall the unannounced inspection visit of Marshal Yazov to the Western Group of Forces (that is, to the FRG)—all by the same simple and efficient but not completely legal means). A confirmation of the first supposition would give reason for curiosity: what kinds of Soviet nuclear weapons remained in the FRG and when will they be taken out?

There is still one other—mostly forgotten, to be sure—subject in this connection. Almost nine years ago, the Swedish Government came out with the proposal for the establishment of a zone free of battlefield nuclear

weapons in central Europe. This idea was later supported and developed by the "Palme Commission" (an independent international commission on disarmament and security) and the communist parties of the GDR and CSSR in collaboration with the West German social democrats. When these parties passed, the governments of the GDR and CSSR appealed to the Government of the FRG with an official initiative, although the nature of the response from NATO was known in advance: on the basis of the NATO strategy, there was always the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack by the superior conventional (nonnuclear) forces of the enemy.

There was talk in those years of the establishment of a nuclear-free "corridor" 300 km wide (150 km on both sides of the line dividing NATO and the Warsaw Pact), that is, of the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG, GDR, and CSSR from the border between the blocs. As far as we remember, the last time that this idea was mentioned seriously was in 1988: Mikhail Gorbachev, appearing in Prague at a mass meeting for Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship, spoke of the willingness of the USSR to withdraw from the "corridor" all Soviet nuclear weapons under the condition that NATO do the same thing on the West German side. Since then, the "corridor" idea has somehow quietly died away (which is quite logical in connection with the disappearance of the schism in Europe); the same thing happened with the GDR, the Warsaw Pact, the friendship meetings, the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, and many other things. But the tactical nuclear weapons remained for the time being—for NATO and the Soviet Union. The East and the West are still able to show only very modest results in the nuclear disarmament race: of medium-range weapons, only missiles have been destroyed but not aircraft; the strategic arsenals remain untouched since 1979 (SALT-2 Treaty), although they are expecting an agreement soon between the United States and the USSR on their 50-percent reduction; but so far tactical nuclear weapons have not been covered by any agreements. As for the latter, there are a number of difficulties having to do with the presence here as well as in the Western bloc of a large number of dual-purpose weapons, that is, missiles, aircraft, and artillery capable of delivering conventional as well as nuclear warheads. But as difficult as it may be, it is necessary to reduce nuclear weapons: this is prompted by political and economic prerequisites. In our Soviet case, it is especially economic considerations. Instead of a corridor, after all, it is possible to conceive of some other spatial construction....

Negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons are probably in the near future. The Paris Declaration of 22 states (November 1990) talks about their necessity. At that time, the president of the USSR declared a willingness to enter into these negotiations a month or two after the signing of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. But considerably more time than that has already elapsed.... The main reason for the delay is the

West's mistrust of the USSR and doubts about our willingness to carry out the treaty on conventional armed forces. (The Soviet press has written much about the tricks of the Ministry of Defense with the objective of exempting our forces and arms from reductions). It is necessary to restore the trust of the Western countries in us. And we think that that this would be helped by a frank—with reasonable limits—account of our nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Asserts SS-23 Issue 'Closed'

LD2407151691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 24 Jul 91

[By Sergey Petukhov and Yury Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 24 July (TASS)—The USSR has carried out in full its obligations in accordance with the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles and with regard to "SS-23" missiles. This was stated at a briefing in the USSR Foreign Ministry press center by Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry in connection with the fact that an attempt has again been made recently to raise the issue of the "SS-23" missiles belonging to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany in the context of the observance of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles by the USSR.

As far as the aforementioned missiles are concerned—those deployed by the Soviet Union in the GDR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia during 1985 and 1986—he noted that these are the property of the above-named countries, that they are on their territories, and that they do not fall within the jurisdiction of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet Union, Vitaliy Churkin said, has submitted explanations on the issue of the "SS-23" missiles belonging to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany and considers that these allow the U.S. concern on this count to be fully relieved and that it is high time that this issue is closed.

U.S. Concerns on East European-Held SS-23's Viewed

PM2507182991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jul 91 Union Edition p 5

[By V. Nadein, followed by unnamed IZVESTIYA correspondent's question to USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, under general headline: "Query About Forgotten Missiles"]

[Text] Washington—The first to publish was the clamorous WASHINGTON TIMES, boasting of access to confidential information. It was the first to quote the text of a coded telegram which Secretary of State J. Baker sent to J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador in Moscow. In the telegram Baker allegedly accused the Soviet side without

any diplomatic niceties of blatantly violating the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The well-known observers R. Evans and R. Novak then reacted to the event. Their clearly conservative leanings are common knowledge, which is why there is nothing surprising about their calling for people to distrust any Soviet government—including the current government, of course. But what is more important is that, for all their bias, Evans and Novak are serious people. And since they have written that the United States had been given information about missiles by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl and President V. Havel of Czechoslovakia, it means that things are serious.

They could hardly be more serious. The accusation is being leveled against the Soviet Union that, following the conclusion of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, it not only failed to scrap all the missiles due to be destroyed, but secretly transferred 72 missiles, known in the West by the abbreviation SS-23 (and as OTR-23's in the USSR) to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and GDR Armed Forces. And it was allegedly envisaged that, under exceptional circumstances, these missiles could be fitted with Soviet nuclear warheads.

All these scandalous articles have been actively supported by conservative politicians such as Republican Senator Jesse Helms. Incidentally, it is not at all clear whether they supported them or were supported by them. Helms was one of the few senators who voted against the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Even now he actively opposes both the already signed CFE Treaty and any agreement on strategic arms.

There was one important detail which prompted this country's serious press to show restraint. In the indefatigable WASHINGTON TIMES articles, the sending date of Baker's dispatch was given as 13 July—that is, four days before the cordial meeting in London between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush. Moreover, it was announced at the meeting that the last point of disagreement on a strategic arms treaty had been overcome.

Bush predicted that the new agreement, which is scheduled to be signed in Moscow, would face a long and hard road toward ratification. But is this assurance of the President's connected with the telegram recently sent to Moscow by his secretary of state?

The doubts about the White House's position were partly dispelled last Tuesday by Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater. He said that "we are continuing to gather information and will be urging the Soviets to provide a full account on this matter" relating to the 72 SS-23's.

In the J. Baker telegram, whose existence an official State Department spokesman declined to confirm Tuesday, the Soviet Union is accused of providing inaccurate information which "contradicts other information available to the United States."

According to THE WASHINGTON POST report, the administration is pressuring the Bulgarian Government to destroy the SS-23's still held by that country's armed forces. This has already been done in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the newspaper claims.

Monitoring [proverka] of disarmament treaties has traditionally been a highly sensitive matter. Many specialists agree that creating a verification system that would provide a 100 percent guarantee of the punctilious observance of such agreements is practically impossible. Even after the most painstaking elaboration, there is still scope for what is simply called mutual trust.

Observers believe that the speediest checks into the reports about the 72 missiles will help both to ratify the CFE agreement and to implement the very first treaty to reduce nuclear missile arsenals. Now is not the time to be getting engaged in wrangling and morbidly suspicious recriminations. The speediest removal of all different interpretations and misunderstandings with the help of accurate and convincing information is primarily in the interests above all to the Soviet Union, which is asserting its place in the world community.

Soviet Side's Explanations

Answering an IZVESTIYA correspondent's question, a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said:

"Another attempt has recently been made to stir up the question of OTR-23 missile systems belonging to Bulgaria, the CSFR, and the FRG in the context of the Soviet Union's observance of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

"As is well known, in 1985-1986 the Soviet Union, in accordance with intergovernmental agreements, supplied a certain number of these missile systems to the GDR, Bulgaria, and the CSFR. In response to the concern shown by the United States in this connection, we have already stated that these systems were supplied long before the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and that there were no and are no nuclear warheads for the missiles. These systems are owned by the aforesaid countries and sited on their territory. Thus, they did not and do not fall under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the Soviet Union has no obligations for them under the treaty.

"As for the Soviet Union's obligations under the treaty as regards its own OTR-23's, these have been fully carried out. All the systems of this type belonging to it, including nuclear warheads, were scrapped within the timetable and in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the treaty. The Soviet side has made major efforts to allay the U.S. side's concern over this issue and to remove any grounds for any misunderstanding. As a goodwill gesture we gave the U.S. side information about the number of missiles and launchers, about the dates of the signing of the agreements to deliver them, and about the period during which the OTR-23's were transferred

to the GDR, Bulgaria, and the CSFR. Detailed explanations were also provided on other issues raised by the U.S. side."

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that the explanations given by the Soviet side on the question of OTR-23 missile systems belonging to Bulgaria, the CSFR, and the FRG make it possible to completely allay any U.S. concern on this score, and it is high time that this matter was closed.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Situation After Pullout From CSFR Viewed

PM1707104991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Jul 91 Second Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent Andrey Krushinskiy: "A Vacuum or a Cordon Sanitaire?"]

[Text] Prague—From time to time the word "final" crops up in publications on the theme of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. Last December the final military unit stationed on Slovak territory was given its sendoff. In January the final warplane of the Central Group of Forces left. Then it was the turn of the final tank, the final troop train, and the final soldier.

The "final soldier" was a general. Colonel General Vorobyev, former commander of the now nonexistent Central Group of Forces, left for home 27 June, leaving not a single Soviet servicemen in Czechoslovakia (aside from the military attache service).

The official farewells were conducted with due decorum in a spirit of mutual benevolence. Before departure Vorobyev was received by CSFR President Vaclav Havel and Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek. Words of gratitude were expressed to the general for the cooperation in the withdrawal of the troops.

But there were also, so to speak, unofficial ceremonies. For example, a rock concert in honor of the "occupiers' retreat" at which one of the singers was Michal Kocab, head of the parliamentary commission to observe the Soviet troop withdrawal (by profession he is a stage performer).

There were also appeals to inaugurate an "End of Occupation Day" at the end of June.

But is the term "occupation" appropriate in this situation? The question is not as simple as it may seem to many. Even though the action mounted by five Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968 cannot be called anything other than the invasion of a sovereign country, the Soviet

troops did not leave as occupiers. Local inhabitants gave them a generally amicable farewell.

Yes, there is food for thought for the historians here. After all, the *raison d'être* of the Central Group of Forces (leaving aside the precise background to its appearance) was not the control of Czechoslovakia but the joint protection with its army of our defensive alliance's forward frontiers. In other words, the same purpose as that of the U.S. Army in countries neighboring Czechoslovakia. And the triumph of the new political thinking found expression this time not only in the righting of the injustice done 23 years ago but in the ceremonial repudiation of bloc policy and of armed confrontation.

I realize that the debate on the theme of "occupiers or non-occupiers" could go on forever. I anticipate my opponents' objections: 1968 is a fact which cannot be deleted from history. But 1989 and 1991 are facts too! The question is: Which is more just and reasonable with regard to the future? Especially when, coincidentally, operation "withdrawal" was completed at almost the same time as a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee held here in Prague to mark the official disbandment of the alliance.

The term "vacuum" is appearing increasingly often in the local press and politicians' speeches now. To be honest, it causes me a certain amazement. What is there to worry about? Is it not evidence of an inner conflict when someone relishing the removal of the Central Group of Forces and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact simultaneously complains about the consequent "void" forming in the system of ensuring security. What about Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland—how do they exist? Has someone threatened them over the last 45 years? Who is threatening the CSFR and against whom would it like collective guarantees?

What some politicians think, journalists sometimes say. Here is what the "independent newspaper" STUDENTSKE LISTY writes: "The withdrawal from implacable totalitarian positions in the central European countries was a calculated move by the Soviets to obtain Western investments and credits to modernize their empire. Meanwhile their military strength has remained absolutely intact and the KGB's international influence in the former socialist satellites has not declined and, since the Persian Gulf war has actually been increasing... The most appropriate thing is to forge the closest contacts with NATO, which in the past 42 years has managed to serve as the West European countries' reliable guarantor against traditional Russian expansionism in the mantle of international bolshevist ideology... Greater activeness should be expected from parties which have designated themselves right-wing and whose grandiloquent program statements advocate Czechoslovakia's participation in NATO."

You may object that this is no more than an extremist outburst unworthy of attention. And that the current Czechoslovak leaders have repeatedly stressed their

interest in good mutual relations with our country. And it should be recalled that in an interview with me on the eve of the New Year CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said: "...We want identically equal relations with all states. We are interested in good relations with the Soviet Union—with the center, the republics, and with people." Here in Czechoslovakia, unfortunately, the USSR, it seems to me, is not in an equal position.

In the six months since then, the Soviet Union has completed the withdrawal of its troops and, not without difficulty for its own economy, has ensured uninterrupted supplies to the Czechoslovak economy of its minimum oil needs. But what changes have there been in Czechoslovakia since then? A tank—a monument to Soviet soldiers—has been defaced and removed from its pedestal. At the same time as Western (primarily FRG) television programs are being broadcast round the clock here the Czechoslovak TV leadership, on the pretext of the CSFR's switch to "summer time," has closed the last small window of objective information from the USSR—it has stopped relaying the "Vremya" program. Soviet newspapers are not bought here (unlike Western ones) and the only information on our life and on the processes taking place in our country that Czechs and Slovaks get comes from their own newspapers, for which the main thing often is to light upon an ill-formed thought from one of our military men or to unearth some "compromising material."

I could cite other examples. For example, contacts between the Czechoslovak Army and the Soviet Army have effectively been terminated whereas reciprocal visits by prominent Defense Ministry officials and parliamentarians to the Pentagon and the headquarters of the Bundeswehr and NATO are enjoying a boom. Whereas a few months ago local leaders said that Czechoslovakia is "seeking non-bloc cooperation, integration from San Francisco to Vladivostok, and the elimination of the structures that divide Europe," now they are campaigning for the retention of NATO and the maximum permissible ties with that bloc.

"Maximum permissible"—because the leaders of that bloc themselves are letting it be known that the entry of the East European countries into NATO—at least at the present stage—is undesirable.

This opinion dominated in particular the conference on the future of European security held recently in Prague. LIDOVE NOVINY asked W. Taft, U.S. permanent representative on the NATO Council and one of the conference participants, a direct question: Will it not be advantageous to the NATO countries if some sort of cordon sanitaire exists between them and the Soviet Union? The "cordon sanitaire" idea is an element of the confrontational understanding of security and does not ensure a satisfactory basis for long-term stability, the U.S. politician replied. But the journalists still wanted to find some link with the North Atlantic pact: If "formal membership ties" with NATO are presently not on the agenda for the Central and East European countries, they

asked, could they be in the future? Taft did not rule that out. "From time to time we must evaluate the situation and if we come to the conclusion that this would increase our security and yours, we would have to be ready to consider that word," he said.

Is there not some hidden blackmail in this? Is the Central European vacuum not becoming a means of pressuring the USSR and of interfering in its internal affairs? Finally, is it not safer for Czechoslovakia and its neighbors if the vacuum remains a vacuum? The Prague newspaper SHPIGL [name as transliterated], commenting on the problem of preparing a draft new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, writes: "Had it ever come to war between the USSR and NATO, then, given the arsenals that the great powers possess we, as a frontline state, would have had no chance of survival. However, the Soviet Union does not threaten NATO today. Nor does it threaten independent Czechoslovakia. Or is someone going to claim the opposite? Indeed, does someone stand to gain from sowing fear and hatred?"

It seems to me that a vacuum in present-day conditions does not pose a danger in itself. Furthermore, it would not be bad if such a vacuum (without blocs or foreign soldiers) spread to other states and the whole world. A historic mission has fallen to the central and East European countries—that of showing the world that it is better to live outside a bloc than inside. And of offering the NATO countries a good argument to show that they should follow the Warsaw Pact's example and disband their military organization.

Further on Troop Withdrawals From Poland

Talks Continue

OW1707055991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1230 GMT 16 Jul 91

[Diplomatic Panorama feature transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Another round of talks on withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland took place in Warsaw on July 9 and 10.

On the whole the talks were constructive, said the chief Soviet negotiator Valentin Koptel'tsev. The two sides, he told DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent, discussed the key issues connected with determining the timing and stages of troop withdrawal. The two delegations also considered property issues and the problem of transit for the Soviet troops leaving the former GDR. At present, the diplomat said, the two sides are engaged in preparations for their next meeting to be held in Moscow on July 23.

Pullout From Jelenia Gora Begins

LD2307203191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1455 GMT 23 Jul 91

[By correspondent Aleksandr Babenko]

[Text] Warsaw, 23 July (TASS)—The withdrawal of units and subunits of the Northern group of forces from Poland's Jelenia Gora voivodship began today. The first transport train carrying the equipment of the guards tank regiment which will be redeployed in the Kiev region has left the garrison near Boleslawiec. It is planned to have the regiment's withdrawal completed by 31 July. The last Soviet soldiers will have left this garrison by the end of the year.

Reports, Comments on End of CFE-2 Talks Fourth Round

Soviet Delegation Cited

LD1707145891 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT
17 Jul 91

[By Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, July 17 (TASS)—The fourth round of the new stage of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] ended here today. After a prolonged lull due to difficulties in drafting a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, delegations from 22 countries participating in the forum held constructive discussions on the restriction of troop personnel and evolving stabilising measures.

At the closing meeting today, the Soviet delegation submitted a working document on the restriction of personnel of the conventional armed forces in Europe. Experts believe this can make the debate more purposeful and concrete.

The Soviet delegation believes the future arrangement should take fundamental principles into consideration. Personnel reduction should be made on a national basis by each participating state. This approach would reflect the realities of the new Europe and non-bloc nature of the negotiations conducted. This would also make it possible fully to consider national peculiarities of the formation of the armed forces and their training.

The Soviet delegation believes personnel reduction should apply to land troops, air forces and air defence aviation. Reductions should not apply to rocketry strategic forces, the Navy, marines, coastal defences, naval aviation, or troops of the country's anti-aircraft defences and units that ensure internal security.

Reductions will not apply to some other units not in the armed forces, specifically, railway and construction troops.

Soviet Initiative Lauded

*PM2407140191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Jul 91 Second Edition p 7*

[By unnamed correspondent: "Realities of New Europe"]

[Text] Vienna—The delegations of the 22 states taking part in the CFE talks are leaving for home. Until the beginning of autumn the still silence of the Hofburg Palace's halls will be broken only by tourists.

How did the summer round of the disarmament debates in Vienna end? A speech at the final plenary session contained what in my view was a sober assessment: After a protracted lull, the delegations have finally accomplished some businesslike, serious work.

Toward the end of the round, devoted mainly to questions of limiting personnel and drafting stabilization measures, the initiative was taken by the Soviet delegation. Its leader, Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, read out a working document which set out the main principles of the future accord on limiting the personnel of armed forces in Europe.

The Soviet side considers that restrictions and reductions of personnel numbers should be carried out on a national basis by each member state.

In our experts' opinion, restrictions should apply to the numerical strength of ground forces, air forces, and air defense aviation. The personnel of strategic missile forces and naval forces, national air defense troops, railroad and construction troops, as well as formations safeguarding internal security should be exempt from limitation. That range fully accords with the mandate of the talks. It is practicable, easy to implement, and precludes fruitless discussions.

The decisive move in the "endgame" was made by our delegation after colleagues from a number of countries had presented their own documents on 4 July. Commentators here believe that their demarche resulted in a noticeable reduction in the number of points of contact in the sides' positions. Attempts to arbitrarily increase the demands are clearly evident. I shall cite just one example: What logic dictated the proposal to include strategic missile troops personnel in the parameters of conventional forces? Clearly, such manipulation does not create a foundation for constructive work.

Soviet Diplomat Interviewed

*OW2507011491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 24 Jul 91*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] For the first time in Europe negotiations are being held which deal with disarmament on a national and not "block" basis. These discussions took place during the

last summer session of the Vienna talks about the reduction of armed forces in Europe. In a special interview with "DP" [Diplomatic Panorama] a Soviet diplomat participating in the discussions said that recently they had moved towards serious and businesslike work. On 14 June a special meeting of the 22 participating countries was called in the Austrian capital to lay the foundations for moves towards the ratification and realisation of the Vienna-1 Agreement. After this regular plenary meetings connected with the formulation of the Vienna-2 agreement were resumed and 2 working groups were formed; one to deal with the reduction of armed forces the other to take stabilising measures.

From National to "Block" Basis

During negotiations the USSR presented a working document which describes their principles for the reduction of armed forces and works on the premise that disarmament should be carried out in each country on a national basis. The point is that the Paris Agreement signed on 19 November was drawn up on a "block" basis i.e. based on quotas allotted to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As the Warsaw Pact as such no longer exists the former principle of "block for block" reductions is no longer valid; therefore the question of the reduction of armed forces on a national basis arose. However it was easier for the USSR to act before when so-called "group interests" existed. Even now the "group approach" has been preserved amongst the NATO countries, but an agreement has also been reached with them regarding the change to the reduction of armed forces on a national basis.

USA: How Many Soldiers Left in Europe?

The presence of American forces in Europe especially in Germany still remains a topic for negotiation. It is supposed that the agreement under preparation will include a clause regarding the number of American troops remaining in Europe. A similar clause in the agreement will concern Great Britain, France, Belgium and the USSR who also have forces in Germany. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany is foreseen when an agreement acceptable to both parties is reached.

Which Forces Will Be Kept?

Determining which forces should be cut is proving complicated. The participants in the negotiations represent different points of view on this matter. The USSR works on the premise that land forces, air forces and air defence should be reduced. These 3 categories are already included in the Paris Treaty on the disarmament of conventional forces in Europe. The other side however insists that a reduction in strategic missile forces, marines, coastal defence, naval air services and railway and building units should be included in the new agreement. Soviet experts basing their position on the fact that the USSR has a completely different military structure to that of its Western negotiating partners. [sentence

[as received] In order to avoid a repeat performance of the discussions regarding disarmament and the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe where discussions came to a standstill it is necessary to make the present agreement easily attainable. The aim is to present this agreement to CSCE members who will meet next March at the Helsinki-2 meeting.

Southern, Central Groups of Forces Abolished

LD1707133591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1200 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Text] The defense minister has issued order number 308 which says that the Southern and the Central Groups of Forces have been abolished as of 1 July this year. Just to remind you that in accordance with the intergovernmental agreements, the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia has been completed.

U.S. Inspectors Visit Kiev Under CSBM Agreement

Evaluate Forces, Plans

LD2207122791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 22 Jul 91

[Text] A group of U.S. military experts has visited Kiev military district to evaluate information about military forces and plans for the deployment of principal systems of weapons and materiel. The American experts are in our country in connection with the Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe, which was signed last year. As is well known, it was signed by 31 European states and also Canada, the United States and Turkey. The document came into effect on 1 July this year. In accordance with the document, each participating state may inspect the military sites of another state.

Satisfied With Inspection

LD2407201391 Kiev Radio Kiev in English 2100 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] The results of the visit by a group of U.S. military experts to Ukraine have been analyzed at the Kiev Military District. The U.S. experts were estimating information on the military forces and (?the plans) of deploying the main armament systems and hardware. Inspection was carried out in compliance with the Vienna document on measures of trust and security signed last year by 31 European countries and also Canada, the United States, and Turkey. According to the Vienna document, every country participant can inspect military objects of other states. The U.S. experts were satisfied with the results of the inspection.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Controversy Over 'Very Last' Semipalatinsk Tests

PM2207215991 Moscow TRUD in Russian 23 Jul 91 p 1

[O. Kvyatkovskiy report: "Will There Be an Explosion?"]

[Text] Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—"I'll hand in my party card after the explosion," Olzhass Suleymenov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and president of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" Movement, stated to the Kazakh press.

The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range has been quiet for around two years now. For the first time a popular [narodnyy] moratorium on tests of mass destruction weapons has worked. The antinuclear movement in Kazakhstan has had wide-ranging social repercussions and won many followers in the USSR and abroad.

Recently there was the first "leak" of information to the effect that another few "very last" explosions were being prepared at the range. The military then revealed their hand to the Kazakhs: The range will finally be closed for explosions as of 1 January 1992, but another three warheads need to be tested. The population will be paid 5 billion rubles as compensation.

Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev refuted reports that he had allegedly already sanctioned these explosions, stressing that the people would decide. For its part, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet is also reserving the final say for a regional referendum.

Preparations for polling the citizens are under way in Semipalatinsk, Karaganda, and Pavlodar Oblasts. It was in this situation that O. Suleymenov decided to state his view with his customary directness...

Meanwhile, holes have been drilled at the test range and, according to certain reports, nuclear warheads have already been placed inside and cannot be retrieved. It is being noted here that these charges are touchstones for the republic's sovereignty. These 300-kilotonne "stones" should ultimately provide an answer to the question of who really has sovereignty in practice—the Semipalatinsk Test Range or the republic on whose territory it is located.

Allegations on Test Operations in Yakutia

91P502664 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Jul 91 p 3

[Unattributed item: "The Secret of a Nuclear Test Site"]

[Text] Once, upon awakening, the inhabitants of the city of Udachnyy, near the Arctic Circle, were surprised to find that the familiar outlines of the surrounding mountains looked somewhat different. Little did they guess

that this was not the result of an earthquake, which had rumbled the day before, but of an underground nuclear explosion.

Now the public of the diamond republic is asking: Has Yakutia been a Union nuclear test site in the recent past? How many explosions have been conducted, and for what purposes? What sort of consequences did they have? In particular, a nuclear explosion code-named "Kraton-3," which the specialists referred to as a "genie released from its bottle?" It would seem that the worst fears are being borne out. A commission created at the request of the inhabitants of the northern republic has concluded that the nuclear explosions (there were 12 of them) caused great harm both to humans and to the ecology. They failed to contain "Kraton-3," which rumbled on the upper reaches of the Markh River, because of the weakness of the cement plug in the hole. There was a radioactive release into the atmosphere; the surrounding area and water were polluted. On what territory?

"We are still investigating that," says V. Alekseyev, chairman of the standing commission on ecology of the Yakut Supreme Soviet. "It is already known that underground nuclear explosions were carried out in Mirninsk Rayon, Tuobuye, and Kyusyur. . . Of course, since 1978, when they began to bury death-dealing warheads in the ancient land of our ancestors, there has been a significant dilution of radioactive substances. The content of strontium-90 in reindeer meat and beef concerns us."

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

'Final Draft' of Chemical Arms Treaty Viewed

*OW2307051191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 22 Jul 91*

[“Diplomatic Panorama” report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The UN Disarmament Conference due to resume its work in Geneva on Tuesday is expected to focus on a convention for banning chemical weapons, officials of the Soviet foreign ministry's arms control and disarmament department told an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent on Monday. Although the issue has been under discussion for nearly 20 years, agreement on finalising the job came recently after the UN special committee for banning chemical weapons presided over by Mr. Sergey Batzanov of the Soviet Union renewed its mandate for the talks, with 39 member nations in the Conference reaching agreement for the convention to be ready by 1992. The final draft will contain nearly 500 pages.

U.S. Position

A breakthrough came in May after President Bush gave up his earlier proposal for a security margin under which the United States reserved the right to hold back to 2 percent of its stockpile of chemical weapons subject to elimination. Following the Gulf war, not only did the

Americans agree to the elimination of their chemical weapons over a 10-year period envisaged by the convention, but they also no longer insist on the right to retaliate with chemical weapons. By now all member countries in the Disarmament Conference, including the United States, seem to be [as received] increasingly inclined to favour a comprehensive chemical ban, or "a total zero" as laid down in the draft convention.

USSR: Technical Hitches

Under President Gorbachev's directive of March 10 this year, and consultations with the appropriate parliamentary committee, the Soviet Defence Ministry submitted a plan for eliminating chemical weapons now pending scrutiny by the cabinet. But one crucial question of a possible site to do so remains unresolved. The residents of the city of Chapayevsk which sites the appropriate facility for the destruction of combat chemicals are strongly opposed to the operation on the grounds of their own safety. The Soviet government ordered the plant in Chapayevsk to be converted into a training centre. But no other alternative site has so far been found because of as much [as received] negative response by the public, including environmentalist groups.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Soviet Ambassador on Border Talks With China

*OW2007200291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
2200 GMT 19 Jul 91*

[From the “Current Events and Commentaries” program]

[Text] The fourth round of Soviet-Chinese talks on border disarmament and on strengthening military trust in border areas concluded in Beijing. The two sides discussed in detail a series of agreements on border disarmament and trust measures in the future. In an interview with Moscow Radio reporter Glebov, Soviet Ambassador Kireyev, who was the head of the Soviet delegation, gave a detailed account of the contents and nature of the fourth round of the talks.

[Kireyev is briefly heard, speaking in Russian, fading out after a few seconds] Kireyev said: In the course of the talks held in Beijing, the two sides exchanged opinions about what categories of armed services should be reduced. This question involved the army, navy, air force, and border defense troops. The two sides also touched on the questions of what kinds of weaponry and armament should be reduced as well as the time limit for the reduction process. The geographic question was discussed most meticulously and thoroughly; in other words, to which regions along the Soviet-Chinese border the agreement should apply and in which geographic areas direct disarmament should take place. This is a solemn and sensitive question. Both sides agreed that this question must be solved.

Kireyev, head of the Soviet delegation for the talks, pointed out: Also discussed were some relatively less complicated questions. These are questions concerned what measures the two sides should adopt to supervise and examine the disarmament process; the proposal that the future treaty be drawn up in the form of a legal treaty, and effective measures to strengthen military trust, or in other words, agreements to be reached between the two sides on such matters as the scale of military exercises held in border areas, the number of personnel used in the exercises, the geographic scope and the period of the exercises, the exchange of information about the exercises, and the invitation of observers from each other's sides. These were the wide-ranging questions discussed at the fourth talks in Beijing.

[Kireyev again heard briefly, speaking in Russian, fading out after a few seconds] Kireyev said: The talks on these kinds of questions between the Soviet Union and China were unprecedented in the past. I say this not only because this is the first time that our two countries have conducted talks on such extremely complicated and sensitive questions, but also because the mechanism we

have established for the talks is worth studying and using for reference by other countries. I would not say that our talks may become an example and model for other countries. While any country or countries will, no doubt, find their own form for talks, the talks between our two countries to discuss the above-mentioned questions were the first of its kind in the Asia-Pacific region.

Kireyev pointed out: Up to now, we have had no experience to speak of. Another thing to which I would invite your attention is that in the course of the talks, the two sides were not [words indistinct], but made ceaseless efforts to strengthen trust, trying to make their stands close to each other and always expressing a desire to seek compromising plans. This was the spirit displayed during the recent talks. Perhaps certain methods used for the talks may evoke the attention of Asia-Pacific countries. Finally, I wish to express the hope that these talks will enable the Soviet Union and China to achieve practical results and will promote similar talks between other countries in the Asia-Pacific region concerning major questions on regional security.

AUSTRIA**CFE-2 Talks on Manpower Cuts, Open Skies Viewed**

*AU1807110191 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
18 Jul 91 p 4*

[Burkhard Bischof report: "Moscow Against Former Allies"]

[Text] Vienna—Even though the first treaty on conventional disarmament is not yet in force, the 22 states participating in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna's Hofburg Palace have been working on another agreement for weeks. The reduction of major items of military equipment is the contents of the first agreement. In the second phase of the CFE, the reduction of military personnel, measures to increase stability, and—and this is what at least the NATO states and the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe have in mind—a comprehensive air inspection regimen will be negotiated.

The 22 participants have already agreed on a working structure for the follow-up negotiations: One work group will deal with personnel reductions, and another one, with stability measures. Meanwhile, three proposals on troop reductions are already on the negotiation table. The position paper that was jointly presented by Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR, is the most far-reaching proposal. It suggests that the individual countries' paramilitary units should also be included in the envisaged personnel reduction.

In contrast, the Soviet proposal is most restrictive: The Soviets do not even want to see their paramilitary units—meaning the KGB border troops or the Interior Ministry's special troops—considered in the planned exchange of information, not to speak of including them in reduction measures. Likewise, they want to see their coastal defense forces, naval infantry, the ground personnel of the air defense forces, and troops for the protection of missile sites excluded.

How much the political landscape has changed over the last two years is shown by the fact that NATO's ideas on the reduction of the military personnel are somewhere in the middle between the Soviet proposal and the position paper of Moscow's former Central and Eastern European allies. While the Western alliance does not call for the reduction of paramilitary units, it does call for their inclusion in the exchange of information between the 22 states. Regarding the Soviet Union's wish to exclude the above-mentioned elements, NATO argues that land-based naval infantry or coastal defense forces must be considered in the troop reduction negotiations.

So the main issue at the follow-up negotiations at Vienna's Hofburg Palace will be which elements of the military personnel will be reduced, which ones must be included in the exchange of information, and which ones do not even have to be considered. The 22 participants

have agreed that each individual country should first put its own reduction figures on the table, which will then be discussed and commented on by the others. In this way, the future upper ceilings of the armed forces personnel will be "multilateralized."

The NATO states in particular attach great importance to the idea of resuming in Vienna, within the scope or on the margin of the CFE, the negotiations on an air inspection regimen ("open skies"). The point in this respect is achieving agreement on military inspection flights over the 22 states' territories. Two rounds of negotiations in Ottawa and Budapest last year were unsuccessful. Eleven weeks ago, a Canadian representative invited Moscow to resume the talks on the "open skies," but so far, the Soviets have not responded. Reportedly, the Soviet military has once again prevented the Soviet Foreign Ministry from giving in.

The West advocates concluding an "open skies" agreement and a troop reduction agreement by March 1992 when the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki begins. Therefore, Ambassador Ruediger Hartmann, who heads the German delegation, appealed to all sides on Wednesday [17 July] to deal with this issue in a "constructive" way following the summer recess of the CFE. The CFE was interrupted for the summer recess yesterday [17 July] and will be resumed in early September.

In the United States, the ratification debate on the first CFE agreement began in the Senate last week. It is expected that the agreement will be ratified in the United States and in most other countries by the late fall. In some countries, such as Turkey, the conclusion of the ratification process is being expected until January 1992. The treaty will enter into force 10 days after the last signatory state has deposited its ratification document in The Hague.

FRANCE**Defense Adviser Wants To Keep Nuclear Triad**

*91ES0899A Paris LE MONDE in French
19 Jun 91 p 12*

[Article by J.I.: "Joxe Adviser Pleads for Maintenance of Nuclear 'Triad'"]

[Text] An adviser to the defense minister has urged parliamentary deputies to support deployment of nuclear-armed Rafale aircraft on the territory of some European states agreeable to the arrangement, and preservation of the Albion plateau facility, where a new ballistic missile—an adaptation of the M.5 strategic submarine missile—could eventually be stored....

Mr. Pascal Boniface, director of the International Relations Institute at Villetaneuse (Seine-St. Denis) and technical adviser for strategic affairs in the office of Mr. Pierre Joxe, testified last week before defense committee deputies on the future of France's deterrent force. That

subject is to be considered at an upcoming Defense Council meeting, chaired by the head of state, as part of the government's review of defense planning out to the year 2002.

Mr. Boniface spoke in favor of modernizing the land-based and airborne nuclear components to complement the existing Strategic Naval Force (FOST), which consists of ballistic missile-launching nuclear-powered submarines. Unlike other experts, who argue there is need for only one other component besides the FOST, Mr. Joxe's adviser believes it may be advisable to maintain a nuclear "triad," reaching "a balance among the three forces about the year 2005."

According to Mr. Boniface, the FOST should consist of five new-generation [NG] submarines comparable to the Le Triomphant, which goes into service after 1994. Currently, France has five renovated Redoutable-class submarines, each carrying 16 multiple-bomb M.4 missiles. The new-generation submarines will have a submerged displacement of 14,200 tons, and each is expected to carry 16 longer-range M.5 missiles equipped with penetration aids to thwart enemy defense systems.

European Advantage

Alongside this new FOST, Mr. Joxe's adviser proposes "a strategic air component" made up of Rafale airplanes armed with the long-range air-to-ground (ASLP) missile. The ASLP, an adaptation of the existing ASMP (medium-range air-to-ground missile) already in service on Mirage IV's and Mirage 2000 N's, is assumed to be able to cover distances in excess of 600 km once fired from the aircraft. According to Mr. Boniface, "The ASLP could take the place of the ASMP in 2002 or 2007, performing both prestrategic and strategic missions."

The defense minister's adviser believes the Rafale-ASLP pair offers several advantages: Among other things, it opens the way toward European security cooperation. The missile might be manufactured jointly with Great Britain (which has similar need for an airborne missile for its current Tornados) or for its future Eurofighter. Also, the Rafale-ASLP pair might be stationed "on the territory of another European state," Mr. Boniface indicated.

In addition to the FOST and strategic air components, Mr. Boniface recommends keeping the existing Albion Plateau site, where 18 single-warhead (megaton-charge) S.3 missiles are ensiled. The fate of the Albion facility will be discussed at the next Defense Council meeting chaired by Mr. Mitterrand. Against those who want the site closed or replaced with a missile that could be moved around via semitrailer truck during times of international tension, Mr. Joxe's adviser argues the Albion site should be kept and used to ensile several multi-warhead launchers adapted from the new M.5 submarine-launched missiles.

"A ground version of the M.5," Mr. Boniface explained, "could be developed without having to replace the missiles currently at Albion on a one-for-one basis, in

order not to be accused of overarming." He added that the Albion site, which today is under Air Force control, could be turned over to the Army, "which would then have its own strategic component."

S-45 Nuclear Weapons System Program Canceled

Debate Over Mobile Missiles Noted

PM2207121091 Paris LE MONDE in French
22 Jul 91 p 16

[Jacques Isnard report: "France Abandons Development of its S-45 Mobile Missile"]

[Text] France is abandoning its S-45 nuclear weapons system program designed to succeed the surface-to-surface missiles stored underground in Provence.

Two days after a 10 July defense council meeting at the Elysee Palace—presided over by the chief of state and devoted to the future of the nuclear deterrent within the context of the new military planning document—the Missiles Department of the General Armaments Commission (DGA) sent a letter to a number of French informing them of the cancellation of the contract for the development of the S-45 weapons system.

Buried in silos on the Albion plateau near the departments of Vaucluse, Alpes de Haute Provence, and Drome, 18 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles for the past 20 years have provided a permanent nuclear response, together with the Mirage IV bombers and missile-launching nuclear submarines. At first the missiles were of the S-2 type. Now they are of the S-3 type, capable of delivering a megaton warhead (over 50 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb) over range of over 4,000 km.

These S-3 missiles are static. By the year 2000 they are due for substantial renovation work on the warheads themselves, the propellant motors and missile structures, and the firing units. This is why several alternatives have been examined with a view to replacing this weapons system at the start of the third millennium.

Argument Over Mobility

The decision to cancel announced to industry by the DGA relates to one of the envisaged solutions—the S-45 program. This is a light (nine tonnes) two-stage ballistic missile initially equipped with a 300-kiloton warhead (15 times the power of Hiroshima) and capable of following a flat or steep trajectory to make its warhead—rendered as undetectable ("furtive") as possible—to cross enemy defenses thanks to sophisticated penetration so-called "aids." Subsequently the S-45 could take the form of an even more accurate multi-warhead missile.

From the outset the program has been the subject of arguments between experts over whether it was not in

France's interest to possess a mobile missile. Stockpiled in military bases—including that on the Albion plateau—during peace time, these missiles, mounted on a trailer truck, would become mobile at times of crisis on orders from the president.

The S-45 program, involving some 30 missiles, has been reckoned by a parliamentary source to be worth a total of some 30 billion francs [Fr] over 12 years.

François Mitterrand very soon opposed the idea that such missiles could be made mobile, with the aim of making them less vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Addressing the National Higher Defense Studies Institute in October 1988 he categorically ruled out such a possibility, lest in the event of international tension the S-45 help to prompt panic reactions among the population, whose defense he is supposed to ensure. Several military figures are surprised by the president's stance, since he previously accepted the principle, under the same conditions, of the mobility of the Hades prestrategic nuclear missile which will replace the Army's Pluton missile starting in 1992.

Recently the advocates of a mobile S-45 have stressed, in the light of the Gulf war, the ability of Iraq's Scud—even though this missile's technology is obsolete—to evade detection and to remain a threat even to an adversary equipped with antimissile missiles.

Other Solutions Examined

Irrespective of the outcome of this debate, the defense minister has nevertheless maintained a state of technological "alertness" by issuing, starting in 1990, development contracts for the S-45 to several companies, including the Aerospatiale group, the Nuclear Energy Commissariat, and the G2P propulsion consortium.

In 1991, for instance, the program was granted an investment of Fr 620 million in payment appropriations, according to a parliamentary report. The number of engineers and technical staff working on the development of the S-45 is reckoned to be roughly 300. The DGA's decision to cancel the contracts, made following the defense council meeting, has meant for industry an immediate halt in orders for purchases and subcontracts abroad, and it has been a bombshell for staff, entailing early termination of employment or transfer for teams of personnel or the return to their original employer for some individual technicians.

In the longer term there is a fear of a permanent dispersal of expertise, which would be detrimental if the government were to launch a replacement program later.

Indeed the abandonment of the S-45 does not necessarily entail the disappearance of the missiles currently stored in the silos on the Albion plateau. This site will remain operational beyond the end of the century. Experts are examining other possibilities apart from the S-45. The plan to deploy other kinds of missiles apart from the S-3 in Provence remains very much alive: It would involve

surface-to-surface missiles derived from the future M-5 missile designed to arm the latest generation of nuclear submarines. To this end a dozen only of these missiles, in their ground version, will be deployed in silos. The cost of this operation is reckoned to be Fr 15 billion.

This solution, which has some advocates in presidential circles, has the advantage of connecting with the idea of relative mobility: The new missiles would be deployed in a somewhat random manner. The dozen weapons envisaged would not always be stored in the same place. They would be scattered, and therefore concealed, in the 18 silos of the Albion plateau, thus complicating an aggressor's task in definitely identifying in advance which of them are actually armed for a response strike and which are empty.

Ministry Issues Communique

*PM2407101491 Paris LE MONDE in French
24 Jul 91 p 7*

[Unattributed report: "The Government Is Envisaging a Missile Common to Submarines and Albion Plateau"]

[Text] Confirming the decision to abandon the S-45 surface-to-surface missile intended to replace the S-3 missile deployed on the Albion Plateau, the Defense Ministry published a communique on Monday 22 July announcing that France was envisaging designing—as some reports suggested—a ballistic missile that could eventually arm both the strategic site in Haute Provence and the new nuclear missile-launching submarines.

"The analysis of the international situation," this communique states, "and its foreseeable development shows that it is not desirable to maintain two separate ballistic missile programs, one for nuclear missile-launching submarines and one for the Albion Plateau. That is why the S-45 program is not being continued beyond the work that has so far been necessary to maintain the capabilities vital for constructing the future missile."

"Detailed studies are currently being carried out to precisely define the characteristics of future nuclear systems with a view to the necessary modernization and the search for strict adequacy."

The ministry explains that this work, the results of which will be ready by the end of the year, "cover two families of missiles—a ballistic missile which could equip both the submarines and the Albion Plateau; a nonballistic missile with different penetration methods from the previous one."

The Defense Ministry is referring to two programs currently under examination:

—The possibility of deriving a land-based surface-to-surface (replacing the S-45, which has now been abandoned) from the M-5 missile intended to arm the new generation of strategic submarines belong to the Le Triomphant class;

—The adaptation of a supersonic cruise missile (like the long-range air-to-surface missile which will borrow its technology from the current medium-range air-to-surface missile of the Mirage IV, Mirage 2000 N, and Super-Etandard planes) for the Rafale fighter plane.

Details on Troop Withdrawal From Germany

Defense Minister Joxe Comments

AU2207164791 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1600 GMT 22 Jul 91

[Text] [Announcer] The French military setup in West Germany is soon going to be reduced. This afternoon Defense Minister Pierre Joxe announced the next stage in the plan for the withdrawal of the French forces stationed across the Rhine since the end of World War II. This will be effected in 1992 by the withdrawal of 20,000 professional soldiers and 1,600 civilians working in Germany for the French administrative departments. Next year there will no longer be French barracks in many German cities: Pierre Joxe explains to Philippe Lefevre:

[Begin Joxe recording] Certain garrisons are going to be totally closed: This is the case of Freiburg, Offenburg, Reutlingen, Kaiserslautern, Muensingen, Neustadt, and Friedrichshafen. Currently, the career military personnel or those under contract to the dissolved regiments or bodies can be individually... [changes thought] will be transferred to other formations of the ground army during the summer of 1992. We are preparing for what will take place next summer and this will moreover permit the staffing of certain units to be brought up to establishment. The civilian personnel will be reclassified in accordance with the same arrangements as those followed in 1991. Finally, the equipment of the dissolved units will be redeployed. [end recording]

[Announcer] Still according to Pierre Joxe, units of 200 men are very shortly going to be reinstalled at Metz, Nancy, Perigueux, and Clermont-Ferrand.

Further Details

AU2307073091 Paris AFP in English 0042 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Paris, July 22 (AFP)—France is to pull a further 10,000 of its troops out of western Germany next year, leaving some 30,000 by the end of 1992, French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe said on Monday. Before France began withdrawing its forces this month, there were 50,000 French troops stationed in Germany.

Some 10,000 troops from the Third Armoured Division stationed in Freiburg began returning home early this month in a first phase, which is to be completed by August 31. Mr. Joxe said a further 10,000 troops of the Fifth Armoured Division would be removed from a base in Landau next year. Among the garrisons which are to

be completely abandoned and returned to German local authorities were Freiburg, Offenburg, Kaiserslautern and Friedrichshafen.

The French minister gave no timetable for the remainder of the French forces beyond next year but he said all troops would be gone within four years at the most "following further negotiations and agreements."

French President Francois Mitterrand has said that all French troops would be removed from Germany by around 1994 or 1995, when all Soviet troops will have been withdrawn from eastern Germany.

Mr. Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl are expected to discuss the withdrawal of French troops when they meet Tuesday in Germany, diplomatic sources said.

Mr. Joxe said the 3,000 French soldiers deployed in Berlin were likely to be the last to return home.

No More Nuclear Tests in Mururoa This Year

AU2307195091 Paris AFP in English 1927 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Paris, July 23 (AFP)—France will not conduct any more nuclear tests this year at its South Pacific atoll of Mururoa, the French secretary of state for foreign affairs said here Tuesday [23 July].

Alain Vivien told journalists a test conducted on July 15 at the atoll in French Polynesia would be the last one this year. It was the sixth test of 1991, and France last year decided to reduce the annual number of tests from eight to six.

Mr. Vivien, just back from an Asia-Pacific tour, said he had officially communicated the decision to the Australian Government. He said that while the Australian media remained hostile to the French nuclear tests, the government had raised the matter only in an "incidental" way.

Minister Presents Second Stage of Army Personnel Cuts

PM2407092491 Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Jul 91 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Army To Be Cut By More Than 50,000 Men in Next Five Years"]

[Excerpts] The French Army could see its numbers fall to 220,000 or 230,000 men in the next five or six years following the government's study of the "format" for the armed forces stemming from the military programming law presented to parliament at the end of the year. It would thus lose between 50,000 and 70,000 men over six years.

These estimates were given on Monday 22 July by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe who officially presented to

the press the second stage, scheduled for 1992, of the withdrawal of French forces from Germany that began in 1991.

In 1990, Francois Mitterrand gave his agreement to a gradual withdrawal of French forces based on the other side of the Rhine since the end of World War II. This withdrawal from Germany of the army corps, which is 48,000 strong excluding civilians and families (another 32,000 people), does not affect the Franco-German brigade or the Berlin garrison. [passage omitted]

This is the first time that Mr. Joxe has put forward the idea that over the next five or six years the French Army would be reduced to 220,000 or 230,000 men. In 1991 the Army has 285,000 men, more if you add to these operational forces in Europe and overseas the staff that are "outside" the defense budget (aid workers, fire fighters, overseas bodies), which it manages but does not pay, even if those staff are in "khaki."

It was therefore to a cut of more than 50,000 men in the Army alone that Mr. Joxe was referring and he did not rule out reductions in the Navy and Air Force. The defense minister took care to say that the size of these cuts, still being examined on the basis of several hypotheses, had not been firmly decided.

However, this reduction, if it is accepted, would be very markedly higher than the reduction (35,000 men in four years) that Jean-Pierre Chevenement, his predecessor, had announced before his resignation. Aside from 1981 and 1987, the Army has lost an average of 3,000 posts per year since 1976.

Defense Committee Chairman: Nuclear Tests To Continue

LD2507061791 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 2030 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] France will not stop its nuclear tests, even to please the Australians or the New Zealanders, says Jean-Michel Boucheron, the chairman of the [national assembly select] committee on defense and the Armed Forces. He was the guest on our phone-in program.

[Begin Boucheron recording] We do not want to be a superpower. We simply want to guarantee our security by a minimum of deterrence, that is, by a minimum member of warheads. These nuclear warheads should be tested as they get older. There are phenomena that cannot be simulated on computer. Thus, for the moment, these tests will continue. We have already significantly reduced our nuclear tests, from eight to six per year. It is possible that we would go farther in this way, but there is the problem of the credibility of the various deterrent forces. If an international agreement is reached on this, France would not be the last to sign it. [end recording]

GERMANY

Officials Hail U.S.-Soviet START Treaty

Kohl: 'Milestone in Disarmament'

LD1707192191 Hamburg DPA in German 1814 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Excerpt] London (DPA)—FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl told journalists after the meeting between the London summiteers and Gorbachev: "This was a truly historic day." The meeting with the heads of state and government of the seven leading Western industrial countries "took place in an open and friendly atmosphere. There were no inhibitions about discussing everything." The atmosphere for the talks was improved by the agreement on the START disarmament talks. This agreement is a "milestone in disarmament." They agreed on all verification procedures, the chancellor said. [passage omitted]

CDU/CSU Officials Welcome Agreement

LD1807104191 Berlin ADN in German 0849 GMT 18 Jul 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Alfred Dregger, CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parliamentary group leader, has described the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to sign the agreement on the reduction of "strategic nuclear weapons" (START) in Moscow at the end of July as a step in the right direction. However, this first step has to be followed by others, Dregger stated in Bonn today, because the reductions will only be marginal and only affect certain weapons systems. Increases are even possible in air and sea-based "strategic" weapons.

Karl Lamers, foreign policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU group, also welcomed the consensus between Washington and Moscow. However, the fact that the agreement falls short of the ambitious aims of 1982, when negotiations started, cannot be overlooked, he emphasized. Therefore, START II has to follow START I soon.

Government Welcomes Treaty

LD2907143491 Berlin ADN in German 1314 GMT 29 Jul 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Federal Government sees "a very important stage in the policy of controlled disarmament" in the signing of the START treaty by presidents Bush and Gorbachev planned for tomorrow. Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel announced this at the news conference today. The government has welcomed the initialing of the treaty with great satisfaction.

The Federal Government expected that the reduction of the strategic arms potential will help and support further efforts for better and more trustful relations between the United States and the USSR. After the treaty on the

reduction of conventional forces, the Federal Government sees the START treaty as further foundation of a comprehensive policy of peace and the reduction of military threats.

NATO Plans to Use Soviet Sites in Ex-GDR Denied

Report Alleges Planned UK, U.S. Troop Exercises
*AU2207094591 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG
in German 21 Jul 91 p 5*

[“fwm” report: “British Soldiers to Eastern Germany?”]

[Text] NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (Christian Democratic Union) wants to have NATO troops exercise on Soviet military premises in eastern Germany as of 1994. Then the citizens in the Lueneburger Heide would be relieved if the 12,000 British soldiers were transferred to the east; in Letzlinger Heide between Stendal and Magdeburg, however, the noise would remain.

In the future, Great Britain wants to have its sole heavy tank division exercise on the biggest exercise site of the Soviet Army in eastern Germany. This division is to become the core of the planned big NATO Rapid Reaction Force and largely replace the task force (6,000 men from eight nations), which is stationed in garrisons that are spread out all over the country.

The Americans, too, want to use exercise sites in the east; because after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army they fear a more intensive discussion in western Germany about the usefulness of the further stationing of Allied troops on German soil.

NATO obviously does not want to take the citizens into consideration concerning its plans in the new laender. Says a NATO expert: “In the east of the FRG the citizens are still more accustomed to the military noise. There the NATO soldiers may exercise for their missions without restraint. We even hope that a transfer will be possible before 1994—if the Red Army withdraws ahead of schedule.”

NATO Officials Deny Report
*LD2107140191 Berlin ADN in German 1316 GMT
21 Jul 91*

[Excerpts] Erfurt/Brussels/Hamburg (ADN)—NATO is not planning to station any troops in eastern Germany before the end of 1994, spokespersons of the NATO headquarters, in Brussels, and NATO's European Supreme Command, in Mons, Belgium, told the Erfurt newspaper THEURINGER ALLGEMEINE (Monday edition). BILD AM SONNTAG reported, with reference to NATO experts, that the alliance was hoping to be able to use former Soviet training areas in eastern Germany before 1994 if the Soviet Army was to withdraw earlier than planned. This, the NATO spokespersons said, was not possible under the two-plus-four treaty, and the

alliance did not have such plans. Decisions about stationing NATO troops in eastern Germany after 1994 will be mainly up to the Federal Republic. Within NATO, there are no concrete plans yet about the deployment of units of the rapid reaction force in eastern Germany. [passage omitted]

No Deployments in East Before 1994
*AU2507155991 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 23 Jul 91 p 3*

[ADN report: “British Want To Go to Saxony-Anhalt With Their Tanks”]

[Text] Erfurt/Brussels/Hamburg—NATO does not plan to station troops in eastern Germany before the end of 1994, not even temporarily for exercises. This was said to THUERINGER ALLGEMEINE, which is published in Erfurt, by spokesmen at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and the European NATO Supreme Command in Mons, Belgium.

Citing NATO experts, BILD AM SONNTAG reported that the alliance hopes to be able to use former Soviet exercise sites in eastern Germany before 1994, if the Soviet Army withdraws ahead of schedule. According to the NATO spokesmen, this is not possible in view of the two-plus-four treaty, and there are no relevant plans being made in the alliance. Regarding the stationing of NATO troops in eastern Germany after 1994, this is, first and foremost, a decision that has to be made by the FRG; however, within NATO there are not yet any specific plans for stationing units of the planned large NATO task force in eastern Germany.

According to BILD AM SONNTAG, however, NATO Secretary General Woerner has confirmed that Great Britain wants to station its sole heavy tank division, which is to form the core of the planned large NATO task force, on the troop exercise ground of Letzlinger Heide (Saxony-Anhalt), which has an area of 250 square km and is currently being used by the Soviets. According to information obtained by the newspaper, the U.S. forces also want to use exercise sites in the east. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Germany, they fear a more intensive discussion in western Germany about the usefulness of the further stationing of Allied troops on German soil.

According to information obtained by ADN from well-informed sources, the British ambassador has already expressed Britain's interest in the Colbitz-Letzlinger-Heide troop exercise site in talks with Bundestag deputies in Bonn. According to German military experts, the reason for the planned transfer is obviously the long-simmering dismay among the German population about the current British exercises in the Lower Saxon area around Soltau-Lueneburg. At the same time, German military experts see the British intentions as an attempt “to gain a footing in Germany.” In this connection, they point to the British troop reduction plans, according to which only one tank division, subordinate

to the NATO task force, is to be left in Germany. Because this "is of no use for the defense of Germany," however, there is no reason for it to exercise in the FRG, the experts say. In addition, the FRG Government has not yet made a decision on the future presence of NATO troops on eastern German territory—a decision which will be made only after 1994. Military circles now fear that the public discussion about the future of troop exercise sites will be further fueled.

GDR's Soviet-Made SS-23's To Be Destroyed

AU2607115991 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 26 Jul

[Text] The 24 Soviet SS-23 missiles that the Bundeswehr took over from the former GDR National People's Army [NVA] will be destroyed before 1994. A spokesman for the Defense Ministry today confirmed a report published by the Essen daily NEUE RUHR-ZEITUNG that, in connection with the scrapping of the weapons, there are technical problems related to the disposal of the highly toxic fuel. He said that an environment-considerate method of destroying the missiles has yet to be developed. According to the spokesman, the missiles are useless because they have no warheads and no launching pads.

Defense Ministry on USSR Troops' Exit Delays

LD2807142291 Berlin ADN in German 1338 GMT 28 Jul 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Contrary to the Federal Government's expectations, the Soviet Armed Forces stationed in eastern Germany will have vacated only two of the five regional capitals by the end of this year. According to DIE WELT (Monday edition), this emerges from an internal Defense Ministry report. According to this report, the Erfurt and Magdeburg locations will be vacated by December 1991, while Soviet troops will probably remain until 1994 in Potsdam, Dresden, and Schwerin, as well as East Berlin.

The failure to meet German demands that priority be given to vacating the regional capitals is not the only point of criticism. The Soviet Supreme Command had so far failed to meet the other urgent Bonn demand of disclosing its plans for vacating the total of 38 airfields on the territory of the former GDR used by Air Force and Army aviation units.

The report of the Armed Forces's Command at the Bonn Defense Ministry comments critically on statements made by high-ranking Soviet military authorities that because of the alleged slow start to the housing construction program for returning officers, financed by the Federal Republic, troop withdrawal, which is supposed to be completed by the end of 1994, could be delayed. According to WELT, the report says that there is no linkage between housing construction and troop withdrawal. The announcement of a delay is an attempt to get more money from the Federal Republic, and is

probably calculated "to influence the discussion and mood within the Soviet Armed Forces." The report is quoted thus: "Despite the various attempts at exerting pressure, which are also supported by the Soviet Defense Ministry, or which may even originate there, the assumption is that the Soviet armed forces withdrawal will continue as planned." (an edited version of the article was prereleased.)

GREECE

Ministry on Turkish Response to Disarmament Offer

NC1707200191 Athens Elliniki Radhiosonia Radio Network in Greek 1830 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Excerpts] The Greek prime minister's peace initiative was made especially within the spirit of the new Europe, peace, and cooperation with our neighbors for stability in the Balkans. This is stressed by the Foreign Ministry in response to today's statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry's media spokesman on this issue.

Ankara's reply to Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis' proposal is negative and contains pretexts and evasions. Mitsotakis' proposal was for limiting offensive weapons along the Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian borders. Turkey's reply was not given officially to the Greek Government, but it was announced today by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. [passage omitted]

The Foreign Ministry statement, which replies to today's statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry media spokesman on the Greek [word indistinct] initiative, noted the following:

The Greek Government expresses its regret, because today's Turkish answer is virtually tantamount to rejection of the Greek peace initiative. This is because Turkey does not agree with a permanent and firm climate of tranquility in the sensitive border triangle that the Greek initiative aims to create.

Turkey's reference to traditional NATO defense purposes of the two countries completely ignores the new European reality, as well as the historic political changes that have taken place in our region. It is precisely these changes that made the Greek initiative possible for the withdrawal not of troops, but of the area's offensive weapons. Turkey knows very well that, although these dangerous weapons have been placed under a general status of limitation by the CFE treaty, nothing prevents their mass concentration in sensitive areas in a way that would create a climate of tension and insecurity.

This sharply negative climate is now prevailing on the Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borders, and this has been established not only by Greece. This is the reason for Greek prime minister's initiative aimed at eliminating this dangerous source of tension and at building trust in the Balkans, particularly in view of the current disturbing situation.

Avoiding the substance of the Greek proposal, Turkey also moves the problem from a Balkan to a bilateral Greek-Turkish framework. Therefore, Turkey intentionally ignores the territorial continuity and multinational nature that characterize the Greek proposal by instead bringing up the worn-out argument about the arming of certain Greek islands in the Aegean. But Turkey knows very well that any measures taken on these islands are clearly defensive and aim only at protecting Greek sovereignty against any objective. Consequently, Turkey makes the mistake of comparing two issues, which have totally different political, military, and geographic bases.

The Greek Government reiterates that the Greek prime minister's initiative was made especially within the spirit of the new Europe, peace, and cooperation with our neighbors for stability in the Balkans. We express the hope that when Turkey, as it declares, completes examination of all aspects of our proposal, it will realize this spirit, which already has been applauded by so many other countries, and that it will finally respond positively to the Greek peace initiative.

ITALY

President Cossiga Lauds START Agreement

AU1907093491 Rome ANSA in English 0817 GMT
19 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Naples, 18 July (ANSA)—Italian head of state Francesco Cossiga on Thursday [18 July] applauded the results of this week's summit in London of the West's seven most industrialized nations (G-7), in particular the decision to support and encourage the shift in the Soviet Union in line with its development towards "democracy, pluralism, respect of human rights and the economic principals of a market economy." [passage omitted]

Turning his attention to the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union to slash long-range nuclear missiles, the START Treaty, Cossiga said "this accord is important because it cuts nuclear weapons by 35 percent. This is still not (total) de-nuclearization, but that will never take place." For the Italian head of state, any realistic security system must rely on maintaining some nuclear potential. [passage omitted]

SWEDEN

Prime Minister: START Agreement 'Not Enough'

LD1707183791 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network
in Swedish 1600 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Text] Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson says in a comment on the START agreement that it is a step in the right direction, but that it is not enough. There will still be enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over. The agreement is an important step, but it is

necessary to go further in order to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, according to Ingvar Carlsson.

TURKEY

Response to Greek Disarmament Offer

Border Demilitarization Proposal Rejected
NC1807113991 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish
16 Jul 91 p 15

[Text] Ankara—Turkey has said that it does not agree with the proposal Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis made to the Bulgarian and Turkish diplomats in Athens for "the removal of offensive arms from the borders of the three countries." A high-ranking official has said in a statement to HURRIYET that "the concept of Turkey's defense and security cannot be considered in parts." The official also asserted that it was unacceptable to exclude the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea from the Greek proposal.

It has been reported that the Greek proposal, which has been supported by Bulgaria, was prompted by the uneasiness caused by the strength of Turkey's 1st Army in Athens and Sofia.

Foreign Ministry Comments

NC1707144491 Paris AFP in English
1415 GMT 17 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Ankara, July 17 (AFP)—Turkey rejected Wednesday a Greek proposal to demilitarize the borders between the two countries and with Bulgaria, but said the proposal could be examined in the context of greater cooperation in the Balkan region.

Ankara accused Greece of undermining efforts to build an atmosphere of confidence between the two ancient rivals by arming its islands off the Turkish coast contrary to international treaties.

Turkey's rejection of the Greek proposal—issued on July 12 by Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis—coincides with the visit this week to the two countries by U.S. President George Bush. [passage omitted] Mr. Mitsotakis had proposed that Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria withdraw all tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, fighter planes and fighter helicopters from their joint frontiers.

An official Greek communique said that Bulgaria had welcomed the proposal and wanted to press ahead with negotiations.

But Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Murat Sungar said that it was difficult to recognize a danger to the three countries by the military presence on the borders.

"The deployment of the Turkish and Greek armies is defined in the context of NATO on one side, and the other side, by the terms of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty, which also concerns Bulgaria," said

Mr. Sungar in a communique. However the Greek proposal to disarm the frontiers could be studied in the context of more cooperation among the Balkan countries, he said.

Improved cooperation between Athens and Ankara was mainly dependent on the situation in the Aegean Sea, where Greece had "armed" the Dodecanese islands, near the Turkish coast, contrary to international treaties, said

Mr. Sungar. "Despite Turkey's efforts, (the Aegean) has not been transformed into a sea of peace and cooperation," he added.

The spokesman urged Greece to comply with the international treaties regarding the Aegean islands so that Mr. Mitsotakis's proposals could be "coherent and credible, and for them to be evaluated in a wider context."

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